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RETHINKING VICTIM-BASED STATUTORY SENTENCING 
ENHANCEMENTS 
KEVIN BENNARDO∗ 
ABSTRACT 
 Punishment enhancements that are triggered by some trait of the victim are deeply en-
trenched in American criminal statutes. The research underlying this Article identified over 
120 distinct traits that a victim could possess that would statutorily enhance the offender’s 
punishment. These enhancements are often based on an inherent trait of the victim (e.g., age, 
disability), the victim’s occupation (e.g., law enforcement officers, utility workers), or a non-
occupational role-based undertaking (e.g., jurors, visitors at a detention center). 
 This Article argues that such victim-based statutory enhancements should be eliminated. 
First, they are dreadfully inegalitarian. These enhancements send the message that society 
prefers the victimization of individuals who do not happen to possess any of the protected 
characteristics. These enhancements create classes of “preferred victims” within society. Ra-
tional offenders are therefore incentivized to select victims who possess none of the triggering 
traits. In other words, such enhancements send the message that society wishes to protect 
some individuals more than others. 
 Second, the Article identifies the four goals that these enhancements are meant to serve: 
(1) deterring the victimization of vulnerable individuals, (2) increasing punishment to account 
for the greater harm that results from victimizing certain individuals, (3) incentivizing indi-
viduals to undertake certain occupations, and (4) honoring certain types of individuals. The 
latter two goals are simply not legitimate uses of the criminal law because they are unrelated 
to any of the theoretical purposes of punishment. The first two goals, while legitimate uses of 
the criminal law, are not well served by the existing legislation. The victim-based traits that 
trigger the enhancements are poor proxies for these legislative goals. For example, an en-
hancement triggered by victimizing a person over the age of sixty-five is both over- and under-
inclusive to achieve the goal of deterring the victimization of vulnerable individuals because 
age is not necessarily correlated with vulnerability. Thus, these victim-based statutory sen-
tencing enhancements should be repealed and replaced with legislation that better accom-
plishes the legitimate underlying goals. 
 
 I. INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................  2 
 II. THE STATUTORY LANDSCAPE ............................................................................  3 
 A. Specially Protected Victims .......................................................................  3 
 B. Scienter Requirements (and Lack Thereof) ...............................................  6 
 C. Types of Enhancements .............................................................................  14 
 III. CATEGORIES OF VICTIM-BASED SENTENCING ENHANCEMENTS .........................  14 
 A. Enhancements Based on Vulnerability-Related Characteristics ...............  15 
 B. Enhancements Based on the Infliction or Risk of Greater Harm ..............  19 
1.   Tangible Harms ....................................................................................  20 
2.   Intangible Harms .................................................................................  22 
3.   Scienter ................................................................................................  24 
4.   Pregnant Individuals ...........................................................................  25 
 C. Enhancements Based on the Desire to Incentivize Certain Occupations 
or Undertakings .........................................................................................  27 
 D. Enhancements Designed to Honor Certain Individuals ............................  34 
 IV. THE INEQUALITY OF VICTIM-BASED STATUTORY SENTENCING ENHANCEMENTS  36 
 V. CONCLUSION .....................................................................................................  39 
APPENDIX. LIST OF SPECIALLY-PROTECTED VICTIMS BY JURISDICTION ...........................  40 
                                                                                                                                        
 ∗ Clinical Associate Professor of Law, University of North Carolina School of Law. 
Many thanks to Molly O’Flynn (LSU 2015) for her invaluable research assistance and to 
Tara Summerville (UNC 2019) and the editors and staff of the FSU Law Review for their 
careful editing. 
2  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:1 
  
 
I.   INTRODUCTION 
 Many criminal statutes enhance the offender’s punishment based 
on certain attributes of the victim. These enhancements send an ine-
galitarian message: Society prefers the victimization of some individ-
uals rather than others. They create a class of “preferred victims.” In-
deed, a rational offender’s response to these statutory punishment en-
hancements would be to victim-shop for an individual who possesses 
none of the specially protected characteristics. 
 In Part II, this Article opens with an overview of specially protected 
characteristics of victims that give rise to statutory sentencing en-
hancements. Although many different offenses contain victim-specific 
enhancements, the primary research for this Article analyzed assault 
and battery statutes in the United States. Over 120 distinct traits were 
identified that, if possessed by the victim, trigger statutory punishment 
enhancements. An Appendix organized by jurisdiction lists the charac-
teristics that, if possessed by the victim, trigger enhanced punishment. 
 In Part III, this Article identifies the four purposes that these en-
hancements are meant to serve: (1) deterring the victimization of vul-
nerable individuals, (2) increasing punishment to account for the 
greater harm that results from victimizing certain individuals, (3) in-
centivizing individuals to undertake certain occupations, and (4) hon-
oring certain individuals. The first two purposes are legitimate uses of 
the criminal law and punishment enhancements; the latter two pur-
poses are not. Thus, all enhancements based on the latter two purposes 
should be repealed. The problem with the current enhancements based 
on the first two purposes is that the victim characteristics that trigger 
the enhancements are poor proxies for the underlying purposes of the 
enhancements. Thus, these enhancements should be rewritten so that 
enhanced punishment is triggered by an offender who actually violates 
the underlying policy of the enhancement rather than by an imperfect 
proxy based on the age or occupation of the victim. 
 Part IV discusses the societal harm that is inflicted by creating clas-
ses of victims based on physical and occupational traits. Different pun-
ishments should not be doled out depending on whether the victim is 
the Governor, the coach of a college sports team, or an ‘ordinary’ per-
son.1 These categorizations do not square with society’s aspirations for 
equality. Instead of dividing victims based on their traits, legislatures 
                                                                                                                                        
 1. In Pennsylvania, knowingly causing bodily injury to the Governor in the perfor-
mance of his duty is a first-degree felony. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2702(a)(2), (b), (c)(28) (2016). 
Doing the same to a college coach during a sports event is a first-degree misdemeanor.  
Id. § 2712(b). Doing the same to an ‘ordinary’ person is a second-degree misdemeanor.  
Id. § 2701(b). 
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should enact sentencing enhancements (if at all) on the basis of gener-
ally applicable categories that are more closely tied to the underlying 
purposes of punishment, such as vulnerability or the infliction of 
greater harm. 
II.   The Statutory Landscape 
 Statutory sentencing enhancements based on traits of the victim 
come in all shapes and sizes. The following subparts provide the lay of 
the land in terms of types of characteristics that trigger such enhance-
ments, the role of scienter in triggering these enhancements, and the 
types of enhancements available. 
A.   Specially Protected Victims 
 For the purposes of this Article, ‘specially protected victims’ (or ‘spe-
cial victims’ for short) are classes of individuals that are treated differ-
ently than ‘ordinary victims’ in the criminalization or punishment of 
offense conduct. The class may be as small as a single person—the 
President, for example2—or as broad as a group that comprises the 
majority of the population—all females, for example.3 
 The ‘special’ characteristic of the victim may be an inherent trait 
(e.g., age4 or disability5), an occupation (e.g., a sanitation worker6 or a 
prosecutor7), or some other role-based characteristic (e.g., a witness in 
an official proceeding8 or a visitor at a detention center9). The special 
characteristic may be a blend of inherent and role-based or occupa-
tional traits, as in the case of a disabled veteran.10 Certain animals 
                                                                                                                                        
 2. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 871 (2012) (threats against the President); id. § 1751  (kidnap-
ping, assaulting, or assassinating the President). 
 3. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-33(c)(2) (2016) (assault or battery on a female by a 
male); V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 13-298(5) (2016) (assault). 
 4. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-13-202(a)(4)(C) (2016) (battery victim age sixty or 
older or twelve or younger); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 612(a)(6), (11) (2016) (assault victim 
age sixty-two or older or younger than six). 
 5. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 265, § 13F (2016) (assault and battery or indecent 
assault and battery on person with intellectual disability); 11 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-5-11(b)  
(2016) (assault on person with disability due to mental or physical impairment). 
 6. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 120.05(3) (McKinney 2016) (assault). 
 7. See, e.g., MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-7(1)(b), (14) (2016) (assault); OHIO REV. CODE  
ANN. § 2903.13(C)(9) (West 2015-2016) (assault). 
 8. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-59(b) (2016) (assault); WIS. STAT. § 940.201 (2015-
2016) (battery or threat to witness, family member of a witness, or person sharing domicile 
with a witness). 
 9. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 784.082 (2016) (assault or battery on visitor in a detention 
facility by a detainee); IDAHO CODE § 18-915B (2016) (propelling bodily fluid or waste at 
certain persons by a detainee or prisoner). 
 10. LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:34.1(B)(2), (C) (2016) (battery). 
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even garner special protection.11 For occupational traits, the special 
protection often extends only to an individual acting in the course of 
her occupation.12 
 The primary research for this Article compiled every type of special 
victim specially carved out in assault or battery statutes in fifty-four 
domestic jurisdictions.13 The offenses of assault and battery were se-
lected because every jurisdiction criminalizes one or both, the offenses 
are easy to locate within each jurisdiction’s code, and the quantity and 
variety of specially protected victims are robust.14 Generally, only spe-
cial victim characteristics particularly described in the assault and 
battery statutes were considered. Victim characteristics identified in 
general provisions setting forth aggravating circumstances to be con-
sidered in the sentencing of all offenses were excluded (e.g., ‘vulnera-
ble victims’ as a generally applicable aggravating sentencing factor).15 
 In order to isolate enhancements that were solely the product of a 
characteristic of the individual victim, several types of enhancements 
were excluded. Most notably, jurisdictionally relevant victims and re-
lationship-based victims will not be discussed in depth. Federal as-
sault and battery statutes contain numerous special characteristics of 
the victim as elements, but these characteristics are often (or perhaps 
always) at least partially jurisdictional.16 The victim’s special charac-
teristic (e.g., an employee of the federal government) is what gives rise 
                                                                                                                                        
 11. See 18 U.S.C. § 1368 (2012) (harming “dog or horse employed by a Federal agency” 
for law enforcement purposes); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-17-09 (2016) (killing or injuring law 
enforcement support animal); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, §§ 649.1, 649.2, 649.3 (2016) (killing  
or mistreating police dog, police horse, or service animal that is used for benefit of a  
handicapped person). 
 12. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 163.165(1)(i) (2015) (assault on operator of a taxi while 
in control of the taxi); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-18-1.05 (2016) (assault on public officer while 
engaged in the performance of an official duty). 
 13. The fifty states, the District of Columbia, Guam, Puerto Rico, and the U.S.  
Virgin Islands. 
 14. Of the fifty-four jurisdictions, only Puerto Rico does not identify any special victims 
directly in its assault and battery statutes. P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 33, §§ 4749-4753 (2016). 
 15. For example, in Puerto Rico, the vulnerability of the victim is identified as a general 
aggravating circumstance to be considered in the sentencing of all offenses.  Id. § 4700(n) 
(identifying minors, elderly persons, persons with a physical or mental disability, and preg-
nant persons); see also id. § 4702(b) (“When one or several aggravating circumstances concur, 
a punishment for a term within the upper half of the range of punishments set forth in this 
Code shall be selected for the crime.”). 
 16. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 111 (assault on governmental employee); id. § 112(a) (assault 
on foreign official, official guest, or internationally protected person); id. § 351(e) (assault on 
member of Congress or Cabinet or U.S. Supreme Court justice); id. § 1389 (assault on ser-
viceman on account of military service); id. § 1501 (federal process server); id. § 1751(e) (as-
sault on President or Vice-President); id. § 2231 (assault on person executing federal war-
rant). It is possible to determine whether the victim’s ‘special’ status carries any significance 
by comparing the penalty for victimizing a ‘special victim’ to the penalty for victimizing an 
‘ordinary victim’ within the territorial jurisdiction of the federal government. Compare, for 
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to federal jurisdiction over the offense. Thus, this Article largely leaves 
federal offenses untouched because of the jurisdictional component of 
these victim characteristics.17 
 Enhancements that arise from the relationship between the of-
fender and the victim are also beyond the scope of this Article. The 
largest set of such offenses is domestic violence offenses.18 Other sub-
sets include abuse offenses against those charged with the care of the 
victim (e.g., abuse of children or dependent adults by caregivers,19 of 
patients by health care professionals,20 or of inmates by correctional 
staff21). These enhancements arise from the violation of a duty or re-
sponsibility of the offender with regard to the victim or the exploitation 
of a position of power. Thus, these enhancements are fundamentally 
different than those arising simply on the basis of a characteristic of 
the victim. 
 Also, the coverage of this Article is limited to special victims between 
the time of birth and the time of death. Thus, statutes directed at the 
                                                                                                                                        
instance, the penalty for any of the immediately above-cited offenses with the penalty for 
assault of anyone within the maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States. See 
id. § 113. 
 17. Notably, in the federal system, the punishment ranges applicable to victimization 
of specially protected victims are sometimes identical to those applicable to the victimization 
of an ‘ordinary’ victim within the territorial jurisdiction of the federal courts. This perfect 
overlap discloses that the victims are only ‘special’ in the jurisdictional sense. See, e.g., 18 
U.S.C. § 1116(a) (adopting the punishments for homicides occurring within the special mar-
itime or territorial jurisdiction of the United States as the punishments for homicide offenses 
against foreign officials, official guests, and internationally protected persons). 
 18. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-6-130 (2016) (defining domestic violence where “the vic-
tim is a current or former spouse, parent, child, any person with whom the defendant has a 
child in common, a present or former household member, or a person who has or had a dating 
[or engagement] relationship . . . with the defendant”); CAL. PENAL CODE § 243(e)(1) (West 
2016) (defining battery against “a spouse, a person with whom the defendant is cohabiting, 
a person who is the parent of the defendant’s child, former spouse, fiancé, or fiancée, or a person 
with whom the defendant currently has, or has previously had, a dating or engagement rela-
tionship”); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-509 (2016) (strangulation of a household member). 
 19. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-101(a) (2016) (neglect of a disabled adult, elder per-
son, or resident by guardian or person having immediate charge, control, or custody); GA. 
CODE ANN. § 16-5-70(a) (2016) (cruelty to children by parent or guardian); MINN.  
STAT. § 609.2325 (2016) (criminal abuse of vulnerable adult by caregiver); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 
13, § 1304 (2016) (cruelty to child by person over the age of sixteen having custody, charge, 
or care of the child); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-503(b) (2016) (child abuse by a person responsible 
for the child’s welfare). 
 20. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 609.231 (1984) (mistreatment of patient by employee of the 
facility); WIS. STAT. § 940.295(3) (2015-2016) (abuse or neglect of patient by employee of  
the facility). 
 21. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5416(a) (2011) (mistreatment of confined persons 
“by any law enforcement officer or by any person in charge of or employed by the owner or 
operator of [the] correctional institution”); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-204 (2015) (mistreating 
prisoners by one “responsible for the care or custody of a prisoner”); WIS. STAT. § 940.29  
(2015-2016) (abuse of resident of penal facility by employee of facility). 
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victimization of the unborn22 or of corpses23 are left out of the discus-
sion. Note, however, that pregnant persons fall within the scope of the 
Article, although part of the rationale for enhancing the punishment 
for victimizing such persons may include protection of the unborn.24 
 With those caveats in play, the research for this Article uncovered 
more than 120 different classes of ‘special victims’ set forth in state 
assault and battery statutes.25 Not surprisingly, the most popular 
characteristic of a victim to trigger a sentencing enhancement is the 
victim’s occupation as a law enforcement officer. A close second is vic-
timization of a correctional officer. The other special classes found in a 
majority of the surveyed jurisdictions are emergency medical person-
nel, firefighters, school teachers or employees, and children below a 
certain age. Other popular classes of special victims (although not pro-
tected in a majority of jurisdictions) include health care workers, indi-
viduals above a certain age, pregnant individuals, transit drivers, pro-
bation employees or parole officers, disabled individuals, sports offi-
cials, and judges. Several jurisdictions offer blanket enhancements ap-
plicable to the victimization of all state and municipal employees.26 
Those jurisdictions were not counted in the individual tally for occu-
pations like firefighter or transit driver even if the occupation would 
fall within the umbrella protection for all governmental employees 
(unless the occupation is otherwise specially protected).27 
B.   Scienter Requirements (and Lack Thereof) 
 Must the offender know that the victim possessed the relevant trait 
to trigger the enhancement? The answer, unsurprisingly, is “it de-
pends.” Many statutes that enhance the punishment for victimizing a 
specific type of victim require that the offender knew or should have 
                                                                                                                                        
 22. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. §§ 11.41.280, 11.41.282 (2006) (assault of an unborn child 
in first or second degree); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 28-397, 28-398, 28-399 (2016) (assault of unborn 
child in first, second, or third degree). 
 23. See, e.g., IOWA CODE § 708.14 (2017) (abuse of a corpse); TEX. PENAL CODE  
ANN. § 42.08 (West 2016) (abuse of a corpse or cremated remains). 
 24. See infra Section III.B.4. 
 25. See infra Appendix. For ease of reference, this Article refers to ‘state’ statutes even 
though the statutes surveyed also include the District of Columbia, Guam, Puerto Rico, and 
the U.S. Virgin Islands. 
 26. See, e.g., 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-2(b)(7) (2016) (employees of the state and mu-
nicipal and political subdivisions); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 265, § 13D (2015) (assault and bat-
tery upon public employees); W. VA. CODE § 62-2-10b(a)(1) (2016) (defining “government rep-
resentative” to include all officers and employees of the state or political subdivisions thereof 
and persons under contract with the state or political subdivisions thereof). 
 27. For example, the Illinois aggravated assault statute specifies numerous individuals 
who would fall within the general class of state and municipal employees. See 720 ILL. COMP. 
STAT. 5/12-2(b) (2016) (e.g., park district employees, peace officers, firemen, correctional of-
ficers, transit employees). 
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known of the special trait of the victim.28 Other statutes go further and 
require that the offender’s illegal conduct be motivated by the special 
characteristic of the victim.29 Many statutes, however, do not explicitly 
provide a separate knowledge requirement regarding the victim’s spe-
cial status.30 In these cases, courts will sometimes interpret the statute 
to require knowledge of the victim’s special status.31 In other cases, 
courts do not.32 
 Far and away, the largest amount of judicial interpretation has sur-
rounded statutes outlawing the victimization of law enforcement offic-
ers. A common scenario involves an offender who assaults or batters 
an undercover law enforcement officer with no knowledge of the of-
ficer’s special status. Indeed, the officer generally takes great pains to 
conceal her true occupation from the offender. Thinking that the officer 
is a compatriot or other criminal, the offender assaults the officer. The 
offender is surprised to later learn the victim’s true identity as a law 
enforcement officer and the enhanced penalty that attaches to the of-
fense as a result. 
 Regrettably, the starting point of many analyses on this issue is the 
United States Supreme Court’s opinion in United States v. Feola.33 
Feola provides a particularly poor foundation for thoughtful consider-
ation because it is both frustratingly unclear and based almost entirely 
on a jurisdictional analysis that has no application in non-federal 
cases. At issue in Feola was “whether knowledge that the intended 
victim is a federal officer is a requisite for the crime of conspiracy, un-
der 18 U.S.C. § 371, to commit an offense violative of 18 U.S.C. § 111, 
that is, an assault upon a federal officer while engaged in the perfor-
mance of his official duties.”34 The Feola defendant and his confeder-
ates had arranged to sell a quantity of heroin to buyers who were in 
fact undercover federal officers.35 But rather than deliver actual her-
oin, the sellers intended to sell a sugar substitute and, if discovered, 
                                                                                                                                        
 28. See, e.g., id. 5/12-2(b)(1) (assault with knowledge that the victim is age sixty or older 
or physically handicapped); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-57(D) (2016) (battery knowing or having 
reason to know that victim was a school employee). 
 29. See, e.g., LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:34(B) (2016) (enhancing punishment if the offender 
knew or should have known that the victim was an active member of the armed forces or a 
disabled veteran “and the aggravated battery was committed because of that status”). 
 30. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.36.031(1)(g) (2016) (assault on a law enforcement officer). 
 31. See, e.g., State v. Morey, 427 A.2d 479, 483 (Me. 1981) (requiring knowledge of the 
victim’s identity as a prison official). 
 32. See, e.g., State v. Brown, 998 P.2d 321, 326-28 (Wash. 2000) (finding that knowledge that 
victim was a law enforcement officer is not an element of assault on a law enforcement officer). 
 33. 420 U.S. 671 (1975). 
 34. Id. at 672-73 (footnote omitted). 
 35. Id. at 674. 
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simply “surprise their unwitting buyers and relieve them of the cash 
they had brought along for payment.”36 
 The majority opinion identified the “federal officer” component of 
the assault statute as “jurisdictional.”37 After all, the federal govern-
ment needs a jurisdictional basis to criminalize conduct; it cannot 
simply outlaw every wrongdoing that goes on within its borders.38 Ac-
cording to the majority, scienter is not needed to support an element 
of an offense that is present only to confer jurisdiction over the of-
fense.39 Thus, the operative question in Feola was whether the require-
ment that the victim be a federal officer was “jurisdictional only.”40 
 The majority went on to identify two non-jurisdictional purposes of 
the statute: to protect federal law enforcement personnel and to guard 
against interference with federal functions.41 The Court found that “re-
jection of a strict scienter requirement is consistent with both pur-
poses.”42 While conceding that scienter would be necessary if the stat-
ute were simply an aggravated assault statute meant to fill holes in 
state statutes that did not enhance penalties for assaults on federal 
agents, the Court found that a primary purpose of the statute was to 
overlap with the coverage of state law while providing a federal forum 
for the prosecution of offenses against federal agents.43 
 The majority ultimately concluded that the statute required only 
intent to assault, not intent to assault a federal officer specifically, and 
that any contrary interpretation would give insufficient protection to 
undercover officers and officers enforcing unpopular laws because 
these officers would have to rely on state prosecutors to bring their 
assaulters to justice.44 The Court found that the defendants suffered 
no unfairness because they knew they were acting illegally, even if 
they did not know the particular identities of their victims, and “[i]n a 
case of this kind the offender takes his victim as he finds him.”45 
                                                                                                                                        
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. at 676. 
 38. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (holding that federal statute crim-
inalizing possessing a firearm in a school zone exceeded Congress’ commerce clause authority). 
 39. Feola, 420 U.S. at 676 n.9. 
 40. Id. (noting that “[t]he question . . . is not whether the requirement is jurisdictional, 
but whether it is jurisdictional only”). 
 41. Id. at 678-79. 
 42. Id. at 679. This statement seems to contradict a previous statement that if the stat-
ute “is seen primarily as an anti-obstruction [of government functions] statute, it is likely 
that Congress intended criminal liability to be imposed only when a person acted with the 
specific intent to impede enforcement activities.” Id. at 678. 
 43. Id. at 683-84. 
 44. Id. at 684. 
 45. Id. at 685. This line of reasoning was reflected in an earlier decision from the Fifth 
Circuit, which also found no knowledge requirement in 18 U.S.C. § 111: “When there is no 
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 The Feola decision is inextricably tied to the jurisdictional nature 
of the “federal officer” component of the federal statute. The Court’s 
opinion, however, fails to clearly explain whether the federal officer 
requirement is jurisdictional only (although it appears that it is not), 
and, if not, why scienter is not required for conviction. The dissenting 
justices interpreted the majority opinion as reading the federal officer 
requirement as jurisdictional only, and endeavored to show why that 
interpretation was faulty.46 Finding that the federal officer require-
ment was designed to deter assaults on federal officers (thus protect-
ing both the officers and their functions) and to reflect the “societal 
gravity associated with assaulting a public officer,”47 the dissent would 
have applied the statute “only where an assailant knew, or had reason 
to know, that his victim had some official status or function.”48 
 The Supreme Court later applied the dictates of Feola in United 
States v. Yermian,49 a case dealing with whether the offense of making 
a false statement in any matter within the jurisdiction of a federal 
agency requires knowledge that the statement was made with regard 
to a matter within a federal agency’s jurisdiction. Finding the within-
a-federal-agency’s-jurisdiction element to be jurisdictional only, the 
majority held that, like the federal agent requirement in Feola, no sci-
enter was required with respect to that element to sustain a convic-
tion.50 The three dissenting Justices would have found the statute am-
biguous and applied the rule of lenity to require the government to 
prove the defendant’s actual knowledge that his statements were 
made within the jurisdiction of a federal agency.51 
 Unlike the federal system, a state’s jurisdiction to criminalize ac-
tivity is based on geography rather than subject matter. Thus, the 
peace officer element of a state statute criminalizing assaults on peace 
officers lacks the jurisdictional component found in a similar federal 
statute outlawing assaults on federal officers. Because the victim-fo-
                                                                                                                                        
doubt of the defendant’s unlawful intention, knowledge of the official capacity of the victim 
is invariably unnecessary; the assailant takes his victim as he finds him.” United States v. 
Young, 464 F.2d 160, 163 (5th Cir. 1972). 
 46. Feola, 420 U.S. at 697-98 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (noting that the majority’s “jurisdic-
tional only” interpretation “is inconsistent with the pertinent legislative history, the verbal struc-
ture of § 111, accepted canons of statutory construction, and the dictates of common sense”). 
 47. Id. at 698. 
 48. Id. at 699. The dissent found it immaterial whether the assailant knew that  
the victim was a federal officer rather than a state or local officer, as that matter was  
“jurisdictional only.” Id. 
 49. 468 U.S. 63 (1984). 
 50. Id. at 68 (“Jurisdictional language need not contain the same culpability require-
ment as other elements of the offense.”). 
 51. Id. at 83 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
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cused element in a state statute is not jurisdictional, different consid-
erations inform whether a scienter requirement should attach to the 
element. Many state statutes explicitly require scienter regarding the 
special trait of the victim.52 Some explicitly exclude scienter as an ele-
ment.53 Others, however, are more ambiguous and thus fodder for  
judicial interpretation. 
 Several state courts have refused to read any scienter requirement 
into otherwise silent statutes of this kind. The Supreme Court of South 
Dakota declined to require knowledge of the victim’s official status for 
conviction under an aggravated assault statute criminalizing the ac-
tions of any person who “[a]ttempts to cause or knowingly causes any 
bodily injury to a law enforcement officer or other public officer engaged 
in the performance of his duties.”54 The court’s holding is based on its 
perception of the legislature’s intent as communicated through the 
wording of the statute.55 The Supreme Court of Washington arrived at 
the same result by interpreting the plain meaning of the language of 
its state’s statute outlawing assaults on law enforcement officers.56 
 Basing its decision explicitly on the reasoning of Feola, the Su-
preme Court of Pennsylvania held that scienter was only necessary to 
safeguard against criminalizing activity that was otherwise lawful: 
“the defendant’s ignorance of the victim’s official status is irrelevant 
since he knows from the outset that his planned course of conduct is 
unlawful.”57 Echoing Feola, the high court of Pennsylvania held that 
                                                                                                                                        
 52. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-203(1)(f) (2016) (requiring that “the person com-
mitting the offense knows or reasonably should know that the victim is a peace officer, fire-
fighter, or emergency medical service provider engaged in the performance of his or her du-
ties,” among other classes of individuals); NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.481(2)(c)(3) (2015) (enhance-
ment requires that “[t]he person charged knew or should have known that the victim was an 
officer, provider of health care, school employee, taxicab driver, transit operator or sports 
official”); see also Hubbard v. State, 725 S.W.2d 579, 580-81 (Ark. Ct. App. 1987) (finding 
that the state failed to adequately demonstrate that criminal defendant knew that battery 
victim was at least sixty years old); People v. Smith, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 820, 822-24 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1993) (holding that statutory requirement that advanced age of the victim must be 
known or “reasonably should be known” by the offender was not unconstitutionally vague); 
People v. Jasoni, 974 N.E.2d 902, 908-10 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012) (finding sufficient circumstantial 
evidence to support finding that criminal defendant knew that his victim was at least sixty 
years old). 
 53. See FLA. STAT. § 784.08(2) (2016) (enhancing the class of offense for assault or bat-
tery on a person aged sixty-five or older “regardless of whether [the offender] knows or has 
reason to know the age of the victim”). 
 54. State v. Feyereisen, 343 N.W.2d 384, 386 (S.D. 1984). 
 55. Id. (“The legislature did not intend to include knowledge of the victim’s identity as 
an element of the offense. And this Court cannot and should not amend a statute to avoid or 
produce a particular result.”). 
 56. State v. Brown, 998 P.2d 321, 326-28 (Wash. 2000) (finding that the legislature had 
not required knowledge of a victim’s status as a law enforcement officer and thus declining 
to read such a requirement into assault statute). 
 57. Commonwealth v. Flemings, 652 A.2d 1282, 1285 (Pa. 1995). 
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the defendant, knowing his action to be wrongful, “takes his victim as 
he finds him.”58 Other courts have adopted this approach, noting that 
the extent of the injury caused by an assault is generally a matter of 
luck not subject to any scienter requirement.59 An important exception 
is that knowledge of the victim’s status as a law enforcement officer 
becomes relevant if the defendant claims that she believed that she 
lawfully acted in self-defense. In such cases, a showing that the de-
fendant knew the victim to be a law enforcement officer will defeat a 
claim of self-defense.60 
 Some courts have also refused to read a scienter requirement into 
statutes enhancing the punishment based on the age of the victim.61 
The rationale is based again on the idea that the defendant assumes 
the risk of the unlucky outcome of wrongful conduct. One court analo-
gized the age of victim to the amount of property taken during a theft: 
the result of the intentional act need not be intended for that result to 
enhance the punishment.62 Illinois courts repeatedly found that con-
viction for aggravated battery on a person over the age of sixty did not 
require proof that the assailant had prior knowledge of the victim’s 
                                                                                                                                        
 58. Id. (citing United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671, 685 (1975); United States v. Young, 
464 F.2d 160, 163 (5th Cir. 1972)). 
 59. See State v. Cebuhar, 567 N.W.2d 129, 134 (Neb. 1997) (analogizing an unwitting 
assault on a peace officer to a case where “a defendant may assault a person, intending to 
cause bodily injury, but nevertheless be charged with the felony of first degree assault if 
serious bodily injury is actually inflicted”). 
 60. Like the Court in Feola, the Flemings court recognized “the defendant’s ignorance 
of an officer’s official status is relevant in those rare cases in which an officer fails to identify 
himself and then engages in a course of conduct which could reasonably be interpreted as 
the unlawful use of force directed either at the defendant or his property” on the theory that 
the defendant’s assault would usually be justified on the basis of self-defense or defense of 
property. Flemings, 652 A.2d at 1285; see also Commonwealth v. Francis, 511 N.E.2d 38, 40-
41 (Mass. Ct. App. 1987) (finding that knowledge was relevant where statute did not explic-
itly require that the offender have knowledge of the victim’s status as a correctional officer, 
but the offender claimed that he believed he was protecting himself against an attack by 
other inmates); Dotson v. State, 358 So. 2d 1321, 1323 (Miss. 1978) (finding that knowledge 
is a requirement where the defendant “reasonably could have assumed that the individual 
was some person unconnected with the police department, who may have been attempting 
to do him some bodily harm”). 
 61. See People v. Suazo, 867 P.2d 161, 170 (Colo. App. 1993) (“The plain language of the 
assault on the elderly statute convinces us that the offense was meant to be a strict liability 
offense.”); Bryant v. State, 599 So. 2d 1349, 1351-52 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992) (finding no 
knowledge requirement for conviction of aggravated assault or battery upon a person sixty-
five years of age or older); Carter v. Nevada, 647 P.2d 374, 377 (Nev. 1982) (per curiam) 
(finding no constitutional issue with statute that enhanced punishment without requiring 
knowledge of the victim’s enhanced age); Zubia v. State, 998 S.W.2d 226, 226-27 (Tex. Crim. 
App. 1999) (en banc) (per curiam) (finding that conviction for injury to a child did not require 
any culpable mental state with regard to the age of the victim). 
 62. Suazo, 867 P.2d at 170. 
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age.63 The rationale was that “[t]o require such knowledge would be to 
nullify the statute, because a person’s age is not as readily ascertaina-
ble as the status of a person, such as fireman or policeman.”64 The Illi-
nois legislature has since amended the statute to require prior 
knowledge of the victim’s age as an explicit element of the offense, ef-
fectively legislatively overruling the contrary judicial decisions.65 
 When confronted with silent or ambiguous statutes, other state 
courts have imposed a scienter requirement in conjunction with the 
victim’s special status. The Supreme Court of Maine held that a 
knowledge requirement is required based on the deterrent and retrib-
utive purpose of the punishment enhancement: 
[W]e cannot see how imposing liability for assault on a prison official 
without also requiring knowledge of his identity could further the 
specific deterrent purpose expressed by the statute. Neither can we 
understand why an individual who commits an assault on a person 
he does not know to be an official is any more blameworthy than one 
who commits an assault punishable under [the general assault stat-
ute] and is thus any more deserving of the greater punishment for 
an offense of a higher class.66 
The Maine court found that the reasoning of both the majority and 
dissent of Feola supported this result because, unlike the federal stat-
ute which was grounded on conferring federal jurisdiction, the state 
statute enhancing punishment for assault of a prison official was 
based on a desire to reflect the gravity of attacking prison officials and 
simultaneously to deter such attacks.67 These statutory purposes are 
not furthered if the offender had no knowledge that the victim was a 
member of the special class.68 
 In a concurring opinion, a justice of the Supreme Court of Washing-
ton likewise opined that the deterrent and retributive rationales un-
dergirding the enhancement supported a knowledge requirement on 
                                                                                                                                        
 63. See People v. White, 608 N.E.2d 1220, 1228-29 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993); People v. Jordan, 
430 N.E.2d 389, 391 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982) (tracing legislative intent of statute “to protect senior 
citizens who were defenseless and often the prey of muggers”). 
 64. White, 608 N.E.2d at 1229; see also Jordan, 430 N.E.2d at 391. But see Zubia, 998 
S.W.2d at 229 n.4 (Meyers, J., dissenting) (“A peace officer or public servant is not necessarily 
identifiable as such by virtue of their physical appearance. On the other hand, a child, an 
elderly individual, and a disabled individual are more often than not identifiable as such 
based upon their physical appearance.”). 
 65. See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-3.05(d)(1) (2016) (requiring that offender “knows the 
individual battered to be” at least sixty years old); People v. Jasoni, 974 N.E.2d 902, 906 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 2012) (chronicling the statute’s amendment to include a knowledge requirement). 
 66. State v. Morey, 427 A.2d 479, 483 (Me. 1981). 
 67. Id. at 483-84. 
 68. Knowledge need not be shown through direct evidence, but could be demonstrated 
“by circumstantial evidence of the defendant’s behavior.” Id. at 485. 
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the part of the offender.69 Finding that the purposes of the Washington 
statute were to punish and deter attacks on law enforcement officers 
because such attacks represent “not only a personal attack, but also 
an act of aggression against the very persons enlisted to secure public 
order,” and thus “a much more serious offense” than an attack against 
a private person, Justice Madsen disagreed with the majority’s holding 
that the Washington statute did not require knowledge of the victim’s 
law enforcement status.70 Finding that the “fundamental purpose” of 
the statute is to “protect peace officers in the lawful discharge of their 
duties from unlawful assaults and batteries,” the Supreme Court of 
New Mexico similarly held that knowledge of the victim’s special sta-
tus is a necessary element of a statute enhancing the punishment for 
assault on a peace officer.71 Other courts have reached the same result, 
albeit with less comprehensive explanations of the reasoning behind 
the conclusion.72 
 In a rare judicial opinion dealing with scienter and an occupation 
other than law enforcement, an intermediate appellate court in New 
Mexico held that proof of the offender’s knowledge of the victim’s iden-
tity as a health care worker is a necessary element even though it is 
not expressly included as an element of the relevant battery statute.73 
The court found that the severity of the punishment consequence—
raising the offense from a misdemeanor to a felony—was a relevant 
factor in determining that the victim’s occupation as a health care 
worker was not a strict liability element.74 Finding that it would be 
“unfair” to enhance the potential consequence of the offense so severely 
based on the victim’s occupation if the occupation was unknown to the 
offender, the court presumed that the legislature intended a 
knowledge requirement in the statute.75 
                                                                                                                                        
 69. State v. Brown, 998 P.2d 321, 328 (Wash. 2000) (Madsen, J., concurring). 
 70. Id. at 329 (“Without a requirement that the assailant have knowledge of the victim’s 
status, assaults against law enforcement officers are not deterred to any greater degree than 
other simple assaults.”). 
 71. State v. Nozie, 207 P.3d 1119, 1128 (N.M. 2009). 
 72. See, e.g., Nelson v. United States, 580 A.2d 114, 118 (D.C. 1990) (per curiam) (stat-
ing that “a defendant cannot be held criminally liable on the charge of assaulting a police 
officer . . . if the defendant did not believe, or have reason to believe, the complainant was a 
police officer”); Fletcher v. United States, 335 A.2d 248, 251 (D.C. 1975) (per curiam) (“The 
judge properly instructed the jury that the fact that the defendant knew or should have 
known that the complainants were police officers was an element of the offense.”); see also 
State v. Allen, 840 P.2d 905, 907 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992) (imputing an intent requirement to 
assault on a law enforcement officer because “[i]f the definition of a crime includes a partic-
ular result as well as an act, the mental element relates to the result as well as to the act”), 
overruled by State v. Brown, 998 P.2d 321, 326 (Wash. 2000). 
 73. State v. Valino, 287 P.3d 372, 376-78 (N.M. Ct. App. 2012). 
 74. Id. at 377. 
 75. Id. at 377-78. 
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C.   Types of Enhancements 
 The consequence of victimizing a member of a special class varies 
widely among jurisdictions, and among classes within each jurisdic-
tion. Some special victims increase the class of offense from a misde-
meanor to a felony76 or increase the degree of the offense.77 Others in-
crease the maximum punishment to which the offender is subjected.78 
Others trigger a mandatory minimum prison term.79 
 This Article avoids close inspection of the resulting type of enhance-
ment, although different enhancements carry different implications. 
An enhancement that only increases the statutory maximum punish-
ment may be little more than a token if the actual sentences imposed 
are not greater than those imposed when an ‘ordinary’ victim is tar-
geted. An enhancement that imposes a mandatory minimum, however, 
places great consequence on whether the victim was ‘special’ or ‘ordi-
nary’ (unless, of course, the mandatory minimum is so minimal that 
sentences for ordinary victims already routinely exceed it). Because 
this Article rejects all victim-based statutory enhancements, the sali-
ent point is that the identity of the victim matters in some way to the 
statutory punishment; the type of enhancement is less important for 
purposes of this Article. 
III.   CATEGORIES OF VICTIM-BASED SENTENCING ENHANCEMENTS 
 Review of state assault and battery statutes reveal several general 
motivations for specially protecting certain victims: (1) a desire to pro-
tect vulnerable individuals; (2) a desire to prevent victimization that 
would cause greater harm (or the risk thereof); (3) a desire to incentiv-
ize certain occupations or other undertakings; and (4) a desire to spe-
cially recognize or show appreciation to certain individuals. 
                                                                                                                                        
 76. For example, in Minnesota it is a gross misdemeanor to assault and inflict demon-
strable bodily harm on an employee of the Department of Natural Resources while engaged 
in forest fire activities, but it is a felony to do the same to a firefighter or emergency medical 
personnel in the course of her duties. MINN. STAT. § 609.2231(2), (2a) (2016). Intentionally 
inflicting great bodily harm upon an ordinary victim is simply a misdemeanor.  
Id. § 609.224(1); see also OR. REV. STAT. § 163.160(3)(d) (2015) (elevating assault in the 
fourth degree from a Class A misdemeanor to a Class C felony if the offender knows that the 
victim is pregnant). 
 77. E.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2903.12(B) (West 2015-2016) (aggravated assault is 
generally a felony of the fourth degree, but if the victim is a peace officer it is a felony of the 
third degree). 
 78. For example, the general punishment for assault in Oklahoma is imprisonment in 
a county jail for up to thirty days, a fine of no more than $500, or both. OKLA. STAT. tit.  
21, § 644(A) (2016). But assault on a court officer gives rise to a potential stay of up to one 
year in a county jail, a fine of up to $1000, or both. Id. § 650.6(A). 
 79. See, e.g., LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:34(b) (2016) (requiring one year of sentence without 
benefit of parole, probation or suspension for aggravated battery of a disabled veteran or 
active member of the military). 
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 These purposes are not mutually exclusive; combinations of these 
rationales are often at play. For example, all four rationales could ar-
guably apply to a sentencing enhancement for victimizing a law en-
forcement officer: officers are placed in vulnerable situations, harming 
an officer causes enhanced harm to society, society wishes to incentiv-
ize individuals to become officers, and officers are worthy of special 
recognition. Because certain enhancements are based on a combina-
tion of rationales, this Part proceeds with a separate discussion of each  
of the four rationales rather than each category of specially  
protected victim. 
A.   Enhancements Based on Vulnerability-Related Characteristics 
 Some folks are easy targets. Certain individuals are easier to as-
sault or batter because of some trait (or lack thereof) that makes it 
more difficult for them to defend themselves from attack, identify their 
assailant, or summon assistance. Indeed, offenders may choose to ra-
tionally target these individuals precisely because they are easier  
to victimize.80 
 Vulnerability motivates sentencing enhancements for victimizing 
groups including children, the elderly, and disabled persons. These 
categories are both over- and under-inclusive. Some people who fall 
into one of the above categories are no easier to victimize than anyone 
else. And some people who do not fall into one of the above categories 
may be uniquely easy to victimize.81 While the underlying rationale of 
increasing punishment when an offender targets a vulnerable victim 
is defensible, that purpose is poorly achieved by using traits such as 
age as proxies. 
 Greater punishment for offenders who victimize the vulnerable 
makes sense from both an incapacitation and deterrence-based per-
spective. Such an offender has shown herself to have a greater likeli-
hood of future dangerousness, not because the offender has heightened 
culpability, but because she is a ‘smart’ criminal. Selecting a vulnera-
ble victim is rational behavior on the part of the offender. ‘Smart’ crim-
                                                                                                                                        
 80. See, e.g., Angela Book, Kimberly Costello & Joseph A. Camilleri, Psychopathy and 
Victim Selection: The Use of Gait as a Cue to Vulnerability, 28 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 
2368, 2379 (2013) (“Targets who displayed vulnerable body language were more likely to 
report past histories of victimization, and psychopaths identified these individuals as being 
more vulnerable to future victimization.”). 
 81. Age is an especially problematic proxy for ease of victimization. As a group, the 
elderly are easier to victimize than those in the prime of life. But when the enhancement is 
triggered by ages as young as sixty, the likelihood of over inclusiveness increases, as does 
the difficulty with proving the offender’s knowledge of the victim’s age by evidence of the 
victim’s appearance. 
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inals attempt offenses they are likely to succeed at without apprehen-
sion. Selecting a victim who is at a disadvantage relative to the of-
fender is ‘smart’ offending. Being a strategic or ‘smart’ offender does 
not increase the reprehensibility of the offense; offenders have no 
moral obligation to give the victim a fair opportunity to escape the of-
fense.82 Assuming that the offender does not have a particular victim 
in mind, one very rational step for the offender to take is to select a 
vulnerable victim. 
 By selecting a vulnerable victim and revealing herself to be a 
‘smart’ criminal, the offender has disclosed a heightened likelihood of 
future dangerousness. If caught, incapacitation theory supports more 
stringent incapacitation for the very reason that the offender has 
shown herself to be effective at offending. Perhaps she has engaged in 
a string of offenses that went unpunished, whereas the less strategic 
criminal is immediately caught and punished after the first offense. 
Incapacitation theory supports a lengthier term of incarceration for of-
fenders who knowingly target vulnerable victims. 
 Assuming that sentencing enhancements deter, vulnerability-
based punishment enhancements make sense from a deterrence-based 
perspective. It is less costly for an offender to victimize a vulnerable 
person because it is more likely that the offender will successfully com-
plete the offense and avoid apprehension. In order to even the playing 
field of deterrence, the punishment for victimizing the vulnerable must 
be increased until the disutility of victimizing a vulnerable individual 
matches the disutility of victimizing a non-vulnerable victim. If victim-
izing a non-vulnerable person has a rate of success of x and carries a 
                                                                                                                                        
 82. From a retributive perspective, enhanced punishment for victimizing the vulnerable 
is problematic because victimizing vulnerable populations is inherently rational. If all else is 
equal, an offender will rationally target the victim who is easiest to victimize. An offender is 
not more blameworthy for making that calculation. Assaulting a defenseless person or robbing 
from the blind is only more reprehensible if the offender is obligated in some way to give the 
victim a fighting chance. Rather, offenders should be expected to rationally victimize the vul-
nerable, and such rational victim-shopping does not give rise to a larger just desert. 
Consider an offender who grabs street performers’ money jars and runs off with them. Of-
fender A only grabs money jars from disabled street performers who are physically unable 
to give chase. Offender B only grabs money jars from able-bodied street performers, but does 
so when the street performers are not paying attention (they are “temporarily disabled” by 
their distraction). Both offenders rob the same number of street performers of the same 
amount of money. Both are attempting to structure their offenses to maximize the likelihood 
of success. Nothing makes Offender A inherently more blameworthy. 
Consider then Offender C, who only grabs money jars from able-bodied street performers 
when they are paying close attention to their money jars. Is Offender C less culpable because 
the street performers are more likely to catch her in the act? Or Offender D, who steals 
money jars but herself cannot run very fast—is she less culpable because she will almost 
surely be caught? Or Offender E, who carries a large sign that reads: ‘Warning: I am about 
to steal your money jar’? All of the offenders are equally culpable—they all seek to steal the 
money jar. Some are just better at getting away with it. An offender’s ability to get away 
with the crime does not increase her culpability for it. 
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punishment of y, then victimizing a vulnerable person with a 2x rate 
of success must carry a punishment of 2y for the punishment to have 
the same deterrent effect. 
 To put it another way, let’s say that victimizing an ordinary person 
comes with the following average variables: a 50% chance of getting 
away with the offense and gaining fifty units of utility and a 50% 
chance of getting caught and suffering fifty units of disutility. But let’s 
say that victimizing a vulnerable person carries a 75% chance of getting 
away with the offense with the same fifty units of utility. The rational 
criminal will prey upon the vulnerable victim every time because she 
is more likely to get away with the offense. A vulnerability-based en-
hancement that increases the severity of punishment to seventy-five 
units of disutility seeks to restore the balance so that the offender has 
no preference between vulnerable and non-vulnerable victims. 
 A possible fault in this logic is that offenders are in fact not deterred 
by increased severity of punishment to the same extent that they are 
deterred by increased certainty of punishment. Studies have shown 
that certainty of punishment has a greater deterrent effect than sever-
ity of punishment.83 Thus, a vulnerability-based severity enhancement 
may have to be quite significant in order to counterbalance the in-
creased likelihood of success incumbent in victimizing vulnerable pop-
ulations. However, this criticism is policy-based: it argues that vulner-
ability-based sentencing enhancements do not efficiently achieve their 
deterrent purpose in the real world, not that deterrence itself is an 
inappropriate motivation. State legislatures are free to disagree and at-
tempt to pursue deterrence through vulnerability-based enhancements. 
 Deterrence and incapacitation theory, however, only support vul-
nerable-victim enhancements when the offender has knowledge of the 
vulnerability. Scienter is a necessity to support enhanced punishment. 
Only offenders who both know of the victim’s vulnerability and target 
the victim based on that vulnerability have shown themselves to be 
‘smart’ criminals with enhanced prospects of future dangerousness. If 
the goal is to lock up or deter offenders who prey on easy targets, it is 
only sensible to enhance the punishment of offenders who knowingly 
and intentionally select easy targets.84 These rationales fail to support 
enhancing the punishment for offenders who had no reason to know 
that the victim was particularly vulnerable because these offenders 
                                                                                                                                        
 83. See Michael Tonry, Purposes and Functions of Sentencing, 34 CRIME & JUST. 1, 28 
(2006) (“[C]ertainty and promptness of punishment are more powerful deterrents than severity.”). 
 84. Issues of difficulty of proof may arise with latent disabilities or age. Certainly cir-
cumstantial evidence should be admissible to demonstrate that the offender knew (or should 
have known) of the victim’s vulnerability. Mere observation of the victim will often suffice to 
put the offender on notice of the victim’s vulnerability. But if the offender chose the victim 
at random or based on a different trait (e.g., the victim appears to be wealthy), punishing 
the offender more because the victim suffers from some unapparent disability does nothing 
to serve deterrence. 
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have not demonstrated an increased threat of future dangerousness. 
Offenders who unknowingly luck upon a victim with a latent vulnera-
bility should not receive enhanced punishment. 
 As discussed above, many current statutes utilize a proxy for vul-
nerability such as age or disability. These proxies are woefully impre-
cise. If the punishment enhancement is meant to target offenders who 
select vulnerable victims, the punishment enhancement should be 
based on vulnerability itself rather than a characteristic of the victim 
that serves as a proxy for vulnerability. Vulnerability is not so difficult 
to measure as to require a substitute proxy such as age, gender, or 
disability. Plenty of older people, women, and disabled people are not 
inherently vulnerable to victimization.85 Plenty of people who fit none 
of these categories are vulnerable.86 An enhancement based on the vul-
nerability of the victim can be successfully implemented without reli-
ance on proxies. Most notably, the federal sentencing guidelines con-
tain an upward offense level adjustment that is applicable to all fed-
eral offenses “[i]f the defendant knew or should have known that a vic-
tim of the offense was a vulnerable victim.”87 Instead of drawing a 
bright line declaring all members of a certain group ‘vulnerable’ or 
‘non-vulnerable,’ the guidelines sensibly permit the sentencing judge 
to determine whether a specific victim was uniquely vulnerable to that 
offense.88 Because of the vast differences in the capabilities of individ-
ual victims, vulnerability is a trait that is best measured on a case-by-
case basis by the sentencing judge rather than one served by a statu-
torily based rigid proxy. A blanket “vulnerable victim” enhancement 
would also be robust enough to permit the sentencing judge to consider 
whether the victim was uniquely vulnerable at the time of the offense 
or to one class of offenses but not another. Case-by-case analysis would 
allow for the enhancement to be tailored to individual circumstances, 
for example, extending the enhancement to a bus driver on an other-
wise empty bus in the middle of the night but not to a bus driver in the 
middle of the afternoon on a busy route. 
                                                                                                                                        
 85. See, e.g., Eamon McNiff, From Cane to Weapon: Senior Citizens Fight Back with 
Cane Fu, ABC NEWS (Sept. 6, 2012), http://abcnews.go.com/US/cane-weapon-elderly-fight-
back-cane-fu/story?id=17162085 [https://perma.cc/8HM7-QDBR]; Dana Sauchelli et al., Fe-
male Victims Fighting Back More Against City Muggers, N.Y. POST (Jan. 27, 2014, 4:09 AM), 
http://nypost.com/2014/01/27/female-victims-fighting-back-more-against-city-muggers/ 
[https://perma.cc/P2DR-AZSX]. 
 86. Consider individuals who are ill, drunk, or high. See generally Katherine B. 
O’Keefe, Note, Protecting the Homeless Under Vulnerable Victim Sentencing Guidelines: An 
Alternative to Inclusion in Hate Crime Laws, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 301 (2010) (discussing 
vulnerability as applied to homeless individuals). 
 87. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3A1.1(b)(1) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2016). 
 88. The commentary defines a vulnerable victim as a person who is a victim of the offense 
or relevant conduct and “who is unusually vulnerable due to age, physical or mental condition, 
or who is otherwise particularly susceptible to the criminal conduct.” Id. at § 3A1.1 cmt. n.2. 
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 In sum, vulnerability-based sentencing enhancements may be le-
gitimately supported by deterrence and incapacitation theories. Legis-
latures that seek to further those goals may elect to create such a stat-
utory enhancement, either applicable to all offenses or to a certain sub-
set of offenses. However, to better further these goals, the enhance-
ment should explicitly be based on the vulnerability of the victim ra-
ther than an imprecise proxy such as age, disability, or other personal 
or occupation-based characteristics. 
B.   Enhancements Based on the Infliction or Risk of Greater Harm 
 Attacks on certain individuals carry the risk of additional harm be-
yond just the infliction of injury to the individual. A battery on an in-
dividual engaged in a beneficial enterprise not only physically harms 
the direct victim but also disrupts the beneficial enterprise. Such a 
disruption may visit a minimal harm on society or, in the case of dis-
rupting a life-saving enterprise, may result in a secondary harm that 
dwarfs the direct injury of the attack itself. 
 The overwhelming majority of occupation-based punishment en-
hancements require that the victim be engaged in her official functions 
at the time of the offense. The focus of these enhancements is the pro-
tection of the beneficial enterprise rather than the protection of the 
individual engaged in the enterprise.89 The physical protection of the 
individual is assumedly adequately accounted for by the non-enhanced 
battery statute; the incremental punishment for battering an individ-
ual in the course of her occupation accounts for the disruption to the 
carrying on of the occupation. 
 These disruptions may be grouped into those which may lead to a 
tangible harm and those which may lead to an intangible harm. A tan-
gible harm is an injury to a third party or to physical property. Batter-
ing a firefighter may result in a building burning down. Battering a 
lifeguard may result in a child drowning. Battering a transit operator 
may result in a train crash. An intangible harm is the disruption of a 
beneficial pursuit, such as disrupting the teaching functions of a school 
teacher, or the justice-dispensing functions of a judge or other officer 
of the court. These two categories are by no means mutually exclusive; 
the victimization of an individual can certainly carry both tangible and 
intangible consequences—battering a school bus driver both disrupts 
the function of the timely delivery of children to their homes and may 
very well also result in the loss of control of the bus and concomitant 
                                                                                                                                        
 89. Enhanced protection of the individual may also be warranted because the enterprise 
places the individual in a vulnerable position or otherwise increases the likelihood that the 
individual will be victimized. 
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physical injury of the occupants of the bus. Both tangible and intangi-
ble harms may be actual or merely involve the creation of the risk of 
such harm. 
1.   Tangible Harms 
 The criminal law is no stranger to enhancing punishment propor-
tionate to the actual or potential infliction of harm.90 Almost all juris-
dictions already increase the statutory punishment for battery based 
on the amount of resulting physical harm to another individual.91 
These enhancements are often written broadly to capture resulting 
harm to third parties (e.g., victims other than the direct victim of the 
physical attack).92 These enhancements are supportable by retributiv-
ism and incapacitation theory because the infliction of greater harm is 
indicative of both greater culpability and a greater likelihood of future 
dangerousness. An offender who inflicts serious bodily injury today 
may be more likely to inflict serious bodily injury tomorrow than an 
offender who only inflicted minor bodily injury today. 
 In short, statutory sentencing enhancements based on the occupa-
tion of the victim are simply unnecessary to account for greater result-
ing physical harm because battery statutes are already written to spe-
cifically account for greater resulting physical harm. If an offender bat-
ters a firefighter or a lifeguard in an emergency situation and as a re-
sult a third party suffers serious bodily injury, the statutory punish-
ment range will be enhanced on account of that serious bodily injury. A 
separate statutory enhancement based on the direct victim’s occupa-
tion as a lifeguard or a firefighter is unnecessary to capture the greater 
actual resulting harm. Moreover, battering a firefighter, lifeguard, or 
transit operator may not lead to any actual additional harm if there is 
no ongoing fire, no drowning child, or no bus crash. Thus, occupation is 
                                                                                                                                        
 90. See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 819 (1991) (“[T]wo equally blameworthy 
criminal defendants may be guilty of different offenses solely because their acts cause differ-
ing amounts of harm.”). 
 91. See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 508.010-508.030 (West 2016) (differentiating de-
grees of assault based upon, inter alia, whether the offense resulted in “physical injury” or 
“serious physical injury”); MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 750.81(1)-750.81a(1) (2017) (differentiating 
punishment for assault and battery based on whether victim suffered “serious or aggravated 
injury”). Unlike physical harm to a person, damage of tangible property that results from a 
battery is not included as a statutory enhancement to battery statutes. Such an enhance-
ment is unnecessary, however, as long as the statutory punishment range is broad enough 
to permit the sentencing judge to take account of resulting property damage in the sentenc-
ing decision. In egregious cases where the resulting damage to property overshadows the 
battery offense, the offender could be charged with a property offense in addition to the  
battery offense. 
 92. See, e.g., IND. CODE § 35-42-2-1(d)(1) (2016) (enhancing battery offense if it “results 
in bodily injury to any other person” (emphasis added)). 
2016] RETHINKING STATUTORY SENTENCING ENHANCEMENTS 21 
  
an imprecise proxy for actual harm; if legislatures seek to enhance pun-
ishment based on actual infliction of tangible harm, then statutes 
should do so explicitly. When no actual additional harm results from 
the attack, enhancing punishment based on the occupation of the vic-
tim simply fails to serve as a fitting proxy for harm inflicted. 
 Of course, legislatures may seek to punish the risk of greater harm 
even if no greater harm actually resulted. Battering a firefighter at the 
firehouse creates the risk that a building will burn down during the 
battery. Battering a lifeguard at her station creates the risk of a 
drowning. Battering a transit operator creates the risk, but not the 
certainty, of a crash. If no building burns, no child drowns, and no 
crash ensues, the batterer has created a risk of additional harm even 
in the absence of greater actual harm. 
 When an offender creates the risk of additional harm, the occur-
rence or nonoccurrence of that harm is simply a matter of fortuity.93 
Despite the chance nature of the result, the criminal law generally 
treats an offender who only risks harm much less severely than one 
who actually inflicts harm. Moral luck is “the principle that an of-
fender is justly to blame if his conduct causes harm, even if the occur-
rence of that harm is fortuitous.”94 Moral luck is common in the crimi-
nal law even if not universally accepted.95 Thus, a reckless drunken 
driver who fortuitously meets no one on the road will generally receive 
a much less severe punishment than one with the ill fortune of running 
down a pedestrian around a blind corner. Assuming that both drivers 
created the same amount of risk, it is not immediately obvious why the 
chance existence of a pedestrian should be of such a large consequence 
to the punishment determination, but American criminal law is con-
sistent in its infliction of greater punishment on the basis of  
actual harm.96 
                                                                                                                                        
 93. Certainly some batteries create a greater risk of harm than others. Battering a life-
guard while a child is actively drowning creates a much greater risk of additional harm than 
battering a lifeguard at a beach with few swimmers and numerous lifeguards during calm 
waters. Yet, in both cases, a child may drown or may not drown. 
 94. Kenneth W. Simons, When Is Strict Criminal Liability Just?, 87 J. CRIM.  
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1075, 1105 (1997). 
 95. See generally David Enoch & Andrei Marmor, The Case Against Moral Luck, 26 LAW 
& PHIL. 405 (2007) (describing the concept of moral luck and arguing that the philosophical 
case for its existence “has not been convincingly established”); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Harm 
and Punishment: A Critique of Emphasis on the Results of Conduct in the Criminal Law, 122 
U. PA. L. REV. 1497 (1974) (arguing against a results-based approach to sentencing). 
 96. For example, a failed attempt at an offense may be treated differently than a com-
pleted offense. Simons, supra note 94, at 1106 n.96. Similarly, offenses with easily quantifi-
able aspects, such as property offenses, often tie the punishment to quantity. The punish-
ment doled out upon thieves is often tied in a meaningful way to the dollar amount of the 
theft, even though presumably almost every thief would have taken more loot had it been 
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 However, a state legislature may reasonably seek to enhance pun-
ishment based simply on the creation of the risk of harm rather than 
the infliction of greater actual harm. Battery statutes currently do not 
provide statutory punishment enhancements for creating an uncon-
summated risk of harm. Depending on the jurisdiction, however, cre-
ating a risk of harm may rise to the level of the separate offense of 
reckless endangerment. When the risk is high, like the battery of 
emergency personnel during an emergency, the battery will almost al-
ways also meet the elements of reckless endangerment. While a milder 
level of risk may not rise to the level of reckless endangerment, it could 
be considered as an aggravating factor within the established ‘ordi-
nary’ punishment range for battery. 
 To the extent that a jurisdiction wishes to enhance the punishment 
for battery based on risk of further harm rather than rely on an addi-
tional count of reckless endangerment, those jurisdictions should 
adopt a statutory enhancement that is expressly based on the risk of 
harm rather than on the occupation or other trait of the victim. Just 
like enhancements based on infliction of actual greater physical harm, 
an enhancement could be calibrated so that it is triggered by the crea-
tion of a substantial risk of serious physical injury to the direct victim 
or a third party. Such an enhancement would be much more cleanly 
targeted than occupation-based enhancements because occupation-
based enhancements are imperfect proxies for risk of harm. Battering 
a lifeguard on a deserted beach when many other lifeguards are on 
duty does not create a substantial risk of greater harm. A competent 
fact finder is perfectly capable of determining whether an offense cre-
ates a substantial risk of serious injury to another based on the actual 
factual scenario. A proxy is not needed to accomplish the job. Thus, 
risk-based statutory enhancements should be triggered directly by the 
creation of risk rather than by a victim-characteristic proxy for risk. 
2.   Intangible Harms 
 In the assault and battery context, an intangible harm is the dis-
ruption or interference with some intangible pursuit. In other words, 
it is an interference with a beneficial undertaking. It is a battery that 
disrupts an educator from educating, a student from learning, a judge 
from judging, or any number of beneficial undertakings. The addi-
tional injury is to the victim’s beneficial function. Because that func-
                                                                                                                                        
there for the taking. The difference in a pickpocket’s punishment may be significant depend-
ing on whether the wallet held $10 or $1000 even though the dollar amount was unknown 
to the pickpocket at the time of the offense. See id. at 1107 n.101 (listing examples of state 
theft statutes, including Arkansas where theft of $500 or less is a misdemeanor punishable 
by a maximum of one year in prison while theft of more than $500 is a felony punishable by 
a minimum of three years’ imprisonment). 
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tion is impaired, the harm is greater than if the same attack was vis-
ited upon the same victim at a time when she was not engaging in the 
beneficial function. Simply put, battering a school teacher on the week-
end is less disruptive to her function as an educator than battering the 
same individual during school hours. 
 The difficulty with penalizing these disruptions through statutory 
enhancements is the lack of a natural stopping point, lest individual 
enhancements be carved out for every conceivable type of societally 
beneficial activity. An assault of a shopkeeper, or a ticket taker at a 
movie theater, or a picker of fruit in the course of her employment also 
disrupts societally beneficial activity. A battery of any one of these peo-
ple in the course of employment is more harmful than an assault on 
an ‘ordinary’ victim because it also disrupts a productive function. But 
then, an assault on a student in the course of her studies disrupts the 
student’s education in addition to whatever physical harm is caused. 
And an assault on a shop patron, or movie ticket purchaser, or an eater 
of fruit in the course of the activity disrupts the victim’s consumption 
and therefore potentially her participation in the economy. Almost all 
activities can be described as productive or socially beneficial in some 
sense. Enacting statutory sentencing enhancements to capture the in-
cremental additional harm caused by the interference with every so-
cially beneficial activity would easily swell into an endless laundry list 
of enhancements that swallows the ‘ordinary’ punishment because at 
least one would be applicable in almost every case. 
 The inherent difficulty with coherently identifying socially benefi-
cial activities deserving of greater protection may be illustrated by try-
ing to fashion an inverse rule. If interference with socially beneficial 
activity is a negative, then interference with socially harmful activity 
is a positive. In accord with this thinking, legislatures would decrease 
the punishment applicable to victimizing individuals engaged in so-
cially harmful activity. Therefore, an offender would be punished less 
harshly for battering a panhandler or a prostitute because it interferes 
with activities that have been deemed socially harmful. But raising 
and lowering the statutory punishment based on the victim’s under-
taking quickly devolves into ranking individuals and pursuits based 
upon their societal ‘value’ and punishing accordingly. Such an exercise 
is as endless as it is alarming. 
 A sounder course would be to leave such gradations to the sentenc-
ing judge. Almost every battery causes some disruption to productive 
society, but this disruption is usually minor when compared to the di-
rect physical harm of the attack. In the mine run of cases, adjusting 
the sentence within the ordinarily applicable punishment range suffi-
ciently accounts for the incremental intangible harm created by the 
disruption. In cases of significant or specific types of disruptions, the 
disruption itself is criminal and could form the basis of an additional 
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charge, like disturbing the peace or interfering with a judicial proceed-
ing.97 An offender whose battery results in such a criminal disruption 
can of course be prosecuted for both offenses—battery and criminal in-
terference with, for instance, a judicial proceeding. Adding a statutory 
enhancement to the battery offense is unnecessary to capture the in-
cremental harm and results in a troubling ranking of individuals’ 
value to society; rather, the offender should be prosecuted for the ad-
ditional count of criminal disruption or simply punished more harshly 
within the ordinary punishment range for any intangible harms at-
tendant to the primary offense. 
3.   Scienter 
 Greater harm, be it tangible, intangible, actual, or risked, only sup-
ports the imposition of greater punishment if the offender knew (or at 
least should have known) of the greater harm at the time of the offense. 
If an offender knows that the victim of the battery is engaged in a ben-
eficial undertaking, then the offender is responsible for interfering 
with that undertaking. But if the offender has no reason to know that 
the victim is, say, a police officer, then the offender should not be held 
responsible for interfering with that function. Particularly where the 
offender believes that the victim is a criminal, as is often the case with 
undercover police officers, the offender has every reason to suspect 
that battering the victim will only disrupt socially harmful behavior 
(in addition to the direct injury to the victim). 
 Some of the courts that reject scienter as an element reason that 
the offender knows that he is acting wrongfully and therefore is re-
sponsible for whatever resulting harm flows from that wrongful con-
duct.98 In other words, the offender takes the victim as he finds him, 
whether that be a like-minded criminal or an undercover police officer. 
The extension of this reasoning is that if the offender did not know 
that he was engaging in wrongful conduct, then the unknown identity 
of the victim would not be sufficient to make the conduct criminal. 
Thus, an individual cannot successfully claim self-defense if the victim 
is a police officer unless the individual had no reason to know that the 
victim is a police officer.99 In this case, the individual believes that his 
                                                                                                                                        
 97. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2810 (2016) (offense of interfering with judicial 
proceedings); IOWA CODE § 719.1 (2017) (offense of interfering with official acts); MINN.  
STAT. § 609.50 (2016) (offense of obstructing legal process, arrest, or firefighting). 
 98. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Flemings, 652 A.2d 1282, 1285 (Pa. 1995) (holding that 
an offender, knowing that he is acting unlawfully, “takes his victim as he finds him”). 
 99. Id. (explaining that “the defendant’s ignorance of an officer’s official status is rele-
vant in those rare cases in which an officer fails to identify himself and then engages in a 
course of conduct which could reasonably be interpreted as the unlawful use of force directed 
either at the defendant or his property” because the defendant’s assault would usually be 
justified on the basis of self-defense or defense of property). 
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actions are justified and therefore non-wrongful. But when self-de-
fense is removed from the equation, the individual knows he is acting 
wrongfully and therefore the argument goes that the offender essen-
tially assumed the risk that he was mistaken regarding the identity of 
the victim. 
 But this distinction makes little sense. If the offender is fully pro-
tected by his mistake when he thought he was acting in self-defense 
against a non-police officer who in fact turns out to be a police officer, 
the offender should be partially protected when he thinks that he is 
battering a non-police officer who in fact turns out to be a police officer. 
If the victim turned out to be the President dressed in disguise and out 
for an incognito jog, it would make little sense to increase the punish-
ment on the basis of the greater harm that results from disrupting the 
office of the President. The batterer would be highly surprised to learn 
that his victim was the President and very well may have chosen not 
to batter him if his identity was known in advance; it is simply a case 
of extremely bad moral luck. The offender’s punishment should depend 
on his culpability, not on such fortuities. Thus, knowledge, or at least 
a reason to know, of the greater harm should be required before pun-
ishment is enhanced on this basis. Enhancing the punishment of an 
ignorant offender serves neither deterrence nor retribution. 
4.   Pregnant Individuals 
 Numerous jurisdictions increase the potential punishment for vic-
timization of pregnant persons.100 For the enhancement to apply, usu-
                                                                                                                                        
 100. For example, in Maine, an assault in which the offender intentionally, knowingly, 
or recklessly causes serious bodily injury to another is generally categorized as the Class B 
offense of aggravated assault. ME. REV. STAT. tit. 17-A, § 208 (2016). However, intentionally 
or knowingly causing serious bodily injury to a pregnant person is an elevated aggravated 
assault, a Class A offense, if the offender knew or had reason to know of the pregnancy.  
Id. § 208-C. 
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ally the offender must have known or should have known of the preg-
nancy.101 Other jurisdictions separately criminalize potentially harm-
ful acts taken against an unborn child.102 A few jurisdictions do both; 
thus, an assault on a pregnant individual may receive harsher punish-
ment through two channels—the punishment enhancement applicable 
to assaulting a pregnant person plus a conviction and resulting pun-
ishment for the separate offense of injury to an unborn child.103 
 Statutory enhancements for the victimization of pregnant persons 
are unique in some respects. Pregnancy is distinct from occupational-
based enhancements in the sense that a pregnant person is constantly 
pregnant, whereas a lifeguard is not constantly guarding lives. In that 
sense, pregnancy is a sounder proxy than some of the other enhance-
ments discussed above. However, pregnancy remains an imperfect 
                                                                                                                                        
 101. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-59a(c) (2011) (providing that lack of knowledge 
that the victim was pregnant is an affirmative defense to a prosecution for assault on a preg-
nant person); FLA. STAT. § 784.045(1)(b) (2016) (enhancement to aggravated battery on the 
basis of the victim’s pregnancy requires that offender “knew or should have known that the 
victim was pregnant”); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-904 (2016) (enhancement for battery of a preg-
nant victim requires that “this fact is known to the batterer”); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-
3.05(d)(2) (2016) (aggravated battery on the basis of the victim’s pregnancy requires the of-
fender’s knowledge of the pregnancy). 
Where the offender’s knowledge of the pregnancy is not required, the enhancement usually 
requires the resultant termination of the pregnancy or some harm to the unborn child and 
appears to be based upon the ‘moral luck’ principle that the offender takes the victim as he 
finds her and is responsible for any greater harm that directly results from the offense con-
duct. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 605(b) (2016) (ignorance that the victim was preg-
nant is no defense to a prosecution for abuse of a pregnant female that results in termination 
of the pregnancy); United States v. Price, No. 4:06-CR-0053-1, 2012 WL 3027844, at *7 (M.D. 
Pa. July 24, 2012) (analogizing the omission of knowledge of pregnancy as an element of the 
offense of distributing controlled substance to a pregnant individual to the omission of 
knowledge as an element of distributing controlled substances within 1000 feet of a school); 
Sitton v. State, 760 So. 2d 28, 31-32 (Miss. Ct. App. 1999) (en banc) (finding that knowledge 
that victim was pregnant is not an element of offense of injury to pregnant woman resulting 
in miscarriage); see also GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-20(g) (2016) (text of assault statute does not 
require knowledge of victim’s pregnancy to enhance offense from misdemeanor to misde-
meanor of a high and aggravated nature). But see Michael H. Hoffheimer, Murder and Man-
slaughter in Mississippi: Unintentional Killings, 71 MISS. L.J. 35, 86 n.172 (2001) (arguing 
that Sitton does not hold that the offender’s knowledge of the victim’s pregnancy is not an 
element of the Mississippi statute). 
 102. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. §§ 11.41.280, 11.41.282 (2006) (assault of an unborn child 
in first or second degree); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 28-397, 28-398, 28-399 (2016) (assault of unborn 
child in first, second, or third degree); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-23.5(a) (2011) (specifying that 
assault on an unborn child requires a battery of the mother but is a “separate offense”); 18 
PA. CONS. STAT. § 2606(a) (2016) (aggravated assault of unborn child); S.D. CODIFIED  
LAWS §§ 22-18-1.2, 22-18-1.3 (2016) (battery and aggravated battery of an unborn child who 
is subsequently born alive). 
 103. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-20(g) (2016) (enhancing simple assault against a 
pregnant victim from a misdemeanor to a misdemeanor of a high and aggravating  
nature); id. § 16-5-28 (separately criminalizing assault of an unborn child); 720 ILL. COMP. 
STAT. 5/12-3.05(d)(2) (2016) (aggravated battery on the basis of the victim’s pregnancy); id. 
5/12-3.1 (separately criminalizing battery and aggravated battery of an unborn child). 
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proxy if the concern is for the unborn child. Not all harms visited upon 
a pregnant individual also harm the unborn child, or even put the un-
born child at risk of harm. 
 If the concern is for the unborn child, the punishment should be 
linked to harm to the unborn child rather than using harm to the preg-
nant individual as a proxy. A pregnancy-based enhancement for bat-
tery is unnecessary because, as discussed above, almost all jurisdic-
tions already have a statutory enhancement based on the resulting 
physical harm to another individual. If a battery of a pregnant indi-
vidual results in harm to an unborn child, the greater-harm enhance-
ment will already reflect the determination to punish greater harms 
more severely.104 A pregnancy-based enhancement therefore could lead 
to double-counting if the sentence was enhanced both on the basis of 
pregnancy and separately on the basis of greater harm. Similarly, if 
the motivation for the enhancement is vulnerability of pregnant indi-
viduals, a general “vulnerable victim” enhancement would be better-
suited for the task than one that uses pregnancy as a proxy for vulner-
ability.105 In order to avoid setting up multiple overlapping punish-
ment enhancements based on imprecise proxies, enhancements should 
be triggered by the actual purpose underlying the enhancement (e.g., 
greater harm or victim vulnerability) rather than by proxy traits  
like pregnancy. 
C.   Enhancements Based on the Desire to Incentivize Certain  
Occupations or Undertakings 
 Some occupation-based sentencing enhancements spring from a de-
sire to incentivize individuals to take on these roles. Some socially ben-
eficial undertakings place an individual in a potentially vulnerable sit-
uation. Many workers must go onto strangers’ properties or drive 
strangers in confined spaces. Other workers must take actions that are 
likely to anger others. While society may sensibly wish to incentivize 
people to assume such undertakings, the criminal law is not the proper 
vehicle to do so. 
 The array of state employees who are likely, by virtue of their offi-
cial duties, to greatly upset some segment of the public is impressive. 
                                                                                                                                        
 104. Similarly, if a jurisdiction found it to be warranted, a generic enhancement could 
be triggered by the creation of the risk of greater harm rather than on the actual infliction 
of harm. See supra Section III.B.1. 
 105. Certainly not all pregnant individuals are unusually vulnerable to all offenses, or 
even to all batteries. The determination should be a fact-dependent one. 
28  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:1 
  
Loosely grouped, some exert power over vehicles, such as parking con-
trol officers,106 traffic officers,107 vehicle inspection officers,108 and traf-
fic accident investigators.109 Some work to safeguard people, such as 
employees of variously-named state departments charged with pro-
tecting children and preventing domestic abuse.110 Others enforce var-
ious code provisions or investigate suspected violations, such as ge-
neric “code enforcement officers,”111 animal control officers,112 building 
or construction code inspectors or enforcers,113 occupational health and 
                                                                                                                                        
 106. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 241(b) (West 2016) (assault on parking control officer); 
FLA. STAT. § 784.07(2) (2016) (assault or battery of parking enforcement specialist); 18 PA. 
CONS. STAT. § 2702(c)(22) (2016) (aggravated assault on parking enforcement officer). 
 107. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 243(b) (West 2016) (battery of traffic officer); FLA. 
STAT. § 784.07(2) (2016) (assault or battery of traffic infraction enforcement officer); N.Y. 
PENAL LAW § 120.05(3) (McKinney 2016) (assault on traffic enforcement officer or agent). 
 108. See D.C. CODE §§ 22-404.02, 22-404.03 (2016) (assault and aggravated assault on 
public vehicle inspection officer). 
 109. See FLA. STAT. § 784.07(2) (2016) (assault or battery of traffic accident investigation officer). 
 110. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 18-915(1) (2016) (assault or battery of social caseworkers or 
social work specialists of the department of health and welfare); IOWA CODE § 708.3A(1)  
(2017) (assault on employee of department of human services); LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:35.1  
(2016) (battery of a child welfare or adult protective service worker); N.J. STAT.  
ANN. § 2C:12-1(b)(5)(e) (West 2016) (aggravated assault on employee of the Division of Child 
Protection and Permanency); V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 298(9) (2016) (aggravated assault and 
battery of investigator, caseworker, or other employee of departments of health or human 
services or other agency providing outreach services). 
 111. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1204(A)(8)(g) (2016) (aggravated assault);  
ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-13-202(a)(4)(A)(i) (2016) (battery); CAL. PENAL CODE § 243(b)  
(West 2016) (battery). 
 112. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 243(b) (West 2016) (battery of animal control officer); 
MINN. STAT. § 609.2231(6)(1) (2016) (assault on animal control officer); OR. REV.  
STAT. § 163.208(1) (2015) (assault on animal control officer). 
 113. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. § 940.208(2) (2015-2016) (battery). 
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safety investigators,114 agricultural inspectors,115 sanitation enforce-
ment agents,116 liquor control enforcement agents,117 conservation of-
ficers,118 railroad officers,119 and employees of the department of reve-
nue.120 Others work in law enforcement, including not just peace offic-
ers but various investigators121 and support personnel such as Breath-
alyzer operators122 and blood alcohol analysts.123 The enforcement of 
codes, rules, and regulations often leave at least one party to the trans-
action with less-than-sunny feelings. 
 When it comes to those involved in the judicial process, North Da-
kota confers blanket protection upon any “person engaged in a judicial 
proceeding.”124 Other jurisdictions specify certain actors, including 
                                                                                                                                        
 114. See MINN. STAT. § 609.2231(6)(1) (2016) (assault). 
 115. See id.; see also IND. CODE § 35-42-2-1(a)(1)(F) (repealed 2014) (battery of state 
chemist or chemist’s agent engaged in duties relating to pesticide use or application); Snyder 
v. King, 958 N.E.2d 764, 783 (Ind. 2011) (interpreting § 35-42-2-1(a)(1)(F) prior to repeal). 
 116. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 120.05(3) (McKinney 2016) (assault). 
 117. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2702(c)(8) (2016) (aggravated assault). 
 118. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.81d(7)(b)(iii) (2006) (assault or battery of conser-
vation officer of the department of natural resources or the department of environmental 
quality); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2702(c)(33), (37), (38) (2016) (aggravated assault on an em-
ployee of Department of Environmental Protection, a wildlife conservation officer of state 
game commission, or a waterways conservation officer of state fish and boat commission); 11 
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-5-5 (2016) (assault on environmental police officer). 
 119. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 784.07(2) (2016) (assault or battery of railroad special officer); 
11 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-5-5 (2016) (assault on railroad police). 
 120. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. § 940.205 (2015-2016) (battery or threat to department of  
revenue employee). 
 121. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2903.11(D) (West 2015-2016) (assault on investi-
gator of the state bureau of criminal identification and investigation); 11 R.I. GEN.  
LAWS § 11-5-5 (2016) (assault on investigator of department of attorney general). 
 122. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 784.07(2) (2016) (assault or battery of breath test officer). 
 123. See, e.g., id. (assault or battery of blood alcohol analyst). 
 124. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-17-01(2)(a) (2016) (assault). 
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judges,125 prosecutors,126 public defenders,127 court officers or employ-
ees,128 jurors,129 witnesses,130 court reporters,131 bailiffs,132 and process 
servers.133 Some states enhance penalties for the victimization of fam-
ily members of certain protected victims, such as the families of judges 
and other public officials.134 
 Examples of enhancements for assaulting or battering those re-
quired to enter the property of another include the special protection 
conferred to utility workers135 and postal employees.136 A Nevada as-
sault statute directly targets home visitation by carving out special 
protection for any “employee of the State or a political subdivision of 
                                                                                                                                        
 125. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-202(1)(e.5) (2016) (assault); MONT. CODE  
ANN. § 45-5-210 (2015) (assault on judicial officer); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:12-1(b)(5)(f) (West 
2016) (aggravated assault on judge or justice); OH. REV. CODE ANN. § 2903.13(C)(9) (West 
2016) (assault on judge or magistrate); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-57(C) (2016) (assault and bat-
tery of judge or magistrate). 
 126. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1204(A)(8)(f) (2016) (aggravated assault); N.Y. 
PENAL LAW § 120.05(11) (McKinney 2016) (assault); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2903.13(C)(9)  
(West 2015-2016) (assault); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2702(c)(11)-(14) (2016) (aggravated assault on 
attorney general, deputy attorney general, district attorney, or assistant district attorney). 
 127. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1204(A)(8)(i) (2016) (aggravated assault); 18 
PA. CONS. STAT. § 2702(c)(15)-(16) (2016) (aggravated assault on public defender or assistant 
public defender). 
 128. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-202(1)(e.5) (2016) (assault); GA. CODE  
ANN. § 16-5-21(m) (2016) (aggravated assault on an officer of the court); WASH. REV. 
CODE § 9A.36.031(1)(j) (2016) (assault on judicial officer or court-related employee). 
 129. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 650.6 (2016) (assault or battery); WISC.  
STAT. § 940.20(3) (2016) (battery of grand or petit juror). 
 130. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-59(b) (2016) (assault on witness summoned to give 
testimony in official proceeding); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 650.6 (2016) (assault or battery); 
WISC. STAT. § 940.201 (2015-2016) (battery or threat to witness). 
 131. See, e.g., MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-7(1)(b), (2)(b) (2016) (simple and aggravated as-
sault); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 650.6 (2016) (assault or battery). 
 132. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 650.6 (2016) (assault or battery). 
 133. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 241(c) (West 2016) (assault); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
5/12-2(b)(10) (2016) (aggravated assault on person authorized to serve process or special  
process server).  
 134. See D.C. CODE § 22-851(d) (2016) (family members of public officials); N.H. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 631:4-a (2016) (family members of certain government officials). 
 135. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-6-21(a)(4) (2011) (assault in second degree with intent to 
prevent utility worker from carrying out lawful duty); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.81e (2010) (as-
sault or battery of an employee or contractor of a public utility while the individual is perform-
ing her duties); MINN. STAT. § 609.2231(10)(1) (2016) (assault upon employee or contractor of a 
utility); MO. REV. STAT. § 565.081(1) (2016) (assault of utility worker or cable worker); 18 PA. 
CONS. STAT. § 2702(c)(36) (2016) (aggravated assault of public utility employee). 
 136. MINN. STAT. § 609.2231(10)(1) (2016) (assault upon employee or contractor of the 
United States Postal Service while engaged in duties). Employees of private delivery services 
seem similarly vulnerable as those of the federal postal service, but are not conferred the 
same protection. 
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the State whose official duties require the employee to make home vis-
its.”137 The legislative history indicates that the amendment was in re-
sponse to an assault on a probation officer during a home visit,138 but 
that the intention was to “protect” all government employees who 
make home visits, such as social workers, building inspectors, and me-
ter readers.139 Supporters of the bill testified that such employees are 
unaware of what adversarial conditions they may encounter during 
home visits and that a potential for violence accompanies such situa-
tions.140 The legislative history of a Louisiana statute that confers 
added protection to utility workers141 indicates that the bill was 
brought after four Cox Communications employees were assaulted with 
firearms during home visits in a two month period and the bill was of-
fered to create “a more serious deterrent to this type of behavior.”142 
 Another set of special victims made vulnerable by their roles or oc-
cupations includes taxi drivers,143 public transit operators,144 and pas-
sengers.145 These individuals are confined to small compartments with 
strangers, have little discretion over who they share that space with, 
and have few means of escape. During floor debate over a bill in the 
                                                                                                                                        
 137. NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.471(1)(b)(6) (2015). 
 138. See MINUTES OF THE ASSEMB. COMM. ON JUDICIARY, 71st Sess. (Nev. Apr. 19, 2001) 
(sponsor of the bill explained that it “was brought forth on behalf of a Parole and Probation 
Officer who was assaulted”). 
 139. See id.; MINUTES OF THE S. COMM. ON JUDICIARY, 71st Sess. (Nev. Feb. 15, 2001). 
 140. Id. 
 141. LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:37.5 (2016) (aggravated assault on utility worker with a firearm 
and the intent to prevent the performance of official duties). 
 142. La. H. Admin. of Criminal Justice Comm. Hearing, Apr. 20, 2006, at 1:22:20-1:24:56 
(testimony of John Steele of Cox Communications: “To meet our customers’ needs, our em-
ployees must enter a person’s home or property, which occasionally puts them in the middle 
of a domestic disturbance or face-to-face with someone who is under the influence of alcohol 
or drugs.”), http://house.louisiana.gov/H_Video/2006/Apr2006.htm. The sponsor of the bill, 
Representative Danny Martiny, noted that utility workers have no choice but to go onto other 
people’s premises as a duty of their employment, much like bus drivers have to drive routes 
in undesirable neighborhoods. Id. at 1:25:30-1:26:55. 
 143. See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 22-3751 (2016) (multiplying maximum fine and term of im-
prisonment for certain offenses against taxicab drivers by a factor of one and a half); NEV. 
REV. STAT. § 200.471(2)(c), (d) (2015) (assault of taxicab driver or transit operator); OR. REV. 
STAT. § 163.165(1)(i) (2015) (assault of taxi driver). 
 144. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 612(a)(3) (2016) (assault of public transit opera-
tor in lawful performance of duties); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:12-1(b)(5)(g) (West 2016) (enhanc-
ing simple assault to aggravated assault when committed against an operator of a motorbus 
because of his status or while he is clearly identifiable as being engaged in the performance 
of his duties). 
 145. See, e.g., 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-2(b)(8) (2016) (aggravated assault on transit 
employee or passenger); WIS. STAT. § 940.20(6) (2015-2016) (battery to public transit vehicle 
operator, driver, or passenger). 
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Louisiana House that would confer special protection to bus opera-
tors,146 the sponsor of the bill described bus drivers as “very, very vul-
nerable” on the basis of their employment.147 To address the special 
vulnerability of picking up unknown passengers, the bill was narrowly 
drawn to exclude school bus drivers and charter bus drivers.148 The 
rationale for the enhanced punishment was partially deterrence-
based, with the sponsor hypothesizing that a would-be offender may 
elect not to assault a bus driver if the would-be offender knew of the 
enhanced penalty.149 Importantly, this protection was also partially 
motivated to incentivize people to apply for jobs as bus drivers and to 
stay in those jobs once hired.150 
 As discussed above, it may be rational from a deterrent or incapac-
itative perspective to enhance punishment based on a victim’s vulner-
ability.151 However, the criminal law should not be used as a vehicle to 
incentivize particular undertakings. Enhanced punishment is an in-
appropriate tool to incentivize individuals to undertake certain occu-
pations, regardless of the occupation’s utility to society. The criminal 
law is a tool like no other. Enhancing an offender’s punishment from a 
misdemeanor to a felony carries significant consequences, including a 
                                                                                                                                        
 146. The enacted statute was codified at LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:34.5.1 (2016). 
 147. La. H. Floor Deb., Apr. 23, 2003, at 2:04:58-2:05:18 (statement of Rep. Melinda 
Schwegmann), http://house.louisiana.gov/H_Video/2003/Apr2003.htm; see also id. at 2:06:52 
(noting desire to put bus drivers “in the same category as other people whose jobs put them 
in a dangerous situation”). 
 148. Id. at 2:05:28-57, 2:09:30-2:10:36 (statement of Rep. Melinda Schwegmann noting 
attempt to narrow bill to only those bus drivers who are required to pick up unknown pas-
sengers as a requirement of their jobs); see also LA.. STAT. ANN. § 14.34.5.1(B) (defining “bus 
operator” to include only employees of a public transit system and specifically excluding 
school bus operators). 
 149. La. H. Floor Deb., supra note 147, at 2:15:23-30 (statement of Rep. Melinda 
Schwegmann); see also Cal. S. analysis of Assem. Bill No. 588 (1996 Reg. Sess.). (The sponsor 
of bill enhancing penalties for assault and battery on public transportation vehicles argued 
that penalties were necessary “to effectively deter violence against transit patrons.”); Cal. 
Assemb. Bill Analysis of Assemb. Bill No. 588 (1996 Reg. Sess.) (stating that enhanced pen-
alties will “help prevent criminal acts from occurring”). 
 150. La. H. Floor Deb., supra note 147, at 2:13:05-13 (statement of Rep. Melinda 
Schwegmann: “How can you expect to hire bus drivers if you’re not saying ‘we’re going to 
prosecute someone who assaults you to the full extent of the law’?”). 
 151. Retributivism does not support these enhancements. As explained above, targeting 
the vulnerable is sensible offending and does not enhance culpability. See supra Section 
III.A. For offenders who lash out at those who have rendered a negative decision against 
them (e.g., have issued them a parking ticket or served them with divorce papers), the offense 
behavior is understandable in the sense that it falls within the range of expected human 
reactions. In other words, the offender has a motive to commit the assault, albeit not a jus-
tification nor an excuse. See Kevin Bennardo, Of Ordinariness and Excuse: Heat-of-Passion 
and the Seven Deadly Sins, 36 CAP. U. L. REV. 675, 675-77 (2008) (arguing that the ordinar-
iness of a slayer’s reaction to a provocation should only constitute the heat of passion partial 
defense when the reaction itself is either excused or justified). 
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severe stigma and potentially a lifetime of difficulty securing employ-
ment and housing.152 An individual offender should not suffer these 
extreme consequences because we as a society seek to attract more 
qualified candidates to be bus drivers or utility meter readers. If the 
government wishes to incentivize qualified people to become bus driv-
ers, it should find ways to make the position more attractive, such as 
higher pay or enticing benefits. If safety is a primary concern, addi-
tional safety measures should be taken to protect bus drivers.153 A de-
sire to attract job candidates is not a proper purpose of punishment. 
 Secondly, with regard to ‘unpopular’ occupations, deterrence does 
not support enhancing the punishment for offenders who lash out at 
those who take unpopular (but societally beneficial) actions for the 
simple reason that angry people are unlikely to be deterred by the pro-
spect of increased punishment. Angry individuals have been shown to 
be more difficult to deter than calm people.154 An individual may be-
come angry at a referee’s call, or with a process server’s service of di-
vorce papers, or a parking control officer’s citation, or a witness’s ad-
verse testimony. Although this anger is not righteous in the sense that 
it is morally deserved, it is understandable in the sense that it is a 
common or expected response. Individuals laboring under the lens of 
anger, righteous or not, are simply less responsive to future punish-
ment as a deterrent.155 When considered in tandem with the fact that 
                                                                                                                                        
 152. See, e.g., COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES RESOURCE CENTER, http://ccresourcecenter.org 
(last visited Aug. 17, 2015) (providing comprehensive overview of collateral consequences  
of conviction). 
 153. See, e.g., Edgar Sandoval & Pete Donohue, Bus Drivers Get New Shield to Protect 
Them from Violent Passengers, but Some Fear It Is Not Enough, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Dec. 31, 
2009), http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/bus-drivers-new-shield-protect-violent-pas-
sengers-fear-article-1.461528 [https://perma.cc/8MBN-GM88]; Richard Weir, T Czar to In-
troduce Glass Partitions to Protect Bus Drivers, BOSTON HERALD (Apr. 11, 2013),  
http://bostonherald.com/news_opinion/local_coverage/2013/04/t_czar_to_introduce_glass_ 
partitions_to_protect_bus_drivers [https://perma.cc/J75N-DSRC]. 
 154. See Eric A. Posner, Law and the Emotions, 89 GEO. L.J. 1977, 1981, 1993-94 (2001) 
(noting that angry individuals discount future sanctions and therefore the threat of sanctions 
have diminished deterrent value). Also, heat of passion leads to a punishment reduction for 
murder. See id. at 1981 (noting that, depending on the motivation, anger can increase or 
decrease guilt). Although these batterers are not laboring under justified anger, that is not 
required for heat of passion slayings. 
 155. Id.; see also RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 7.2 (8th ed. 2011) 
(“The notion of the criminal as a rational calculator will strike many readers as unrealistic, 
especially when applied to criminals having little education or to crimes not committed for 
pecuniary gain. But . . . a better test of a theory than the realism of its assumptions is its 
predictive power.”). 
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severity of punishment does not deter as much as certainty of punish-
ment,156 deterrence is a decidedly poor justification for enhancing pun-
ishment in an attempt to protect individuals engaged in certain un-
popular pursuits from angry offenders.157 
D.   Enhancements Designed to Honor Certain Individuals 
 Some individuals receive special protection, at least in part, to 
honor some function they play or have played in society. The special 
protection is a form of recognition of their service. Once a legislature 
starts down this path, however, it is difficult to mete out a stopping 
point. One legislator may propose special protection of military veter-
ans, another legislator may propose special protection of teachers, and 
on and on. Besides the inherent difficulty of legislative self-restraint, 
the enhancement of criminal punishment is not a proper tool to honor 
particular individuals. 
 Louisiana punishes offenders who knowingly batter an active mem-
ber of the United States Armed Forces or a disabled veteran with a 
mandatory minimum of imprisonment for one year if the battery was 
committed on the basis of that status.158 Battery of an ‘ordinary’ person 
carries no mandatory minimum term of imprisonment.159 Testimony 
before the relevant legislative committees described the bill as “a to-
ken to our men and women in uniform,”160 a “nod to our soldiers,”161 
and “a salute to our military.”162 Repeated statements were made dur-
ing the legislative process to the effect that the penalty enhancement 
was warranted to demonstrate equal or greater respect and apprecia-
tion for members of the armed forces in comparison to occupations that 
                                                                                                                                        
 156. See Tonry, supra note 83, at 28 (“[C]ertainty and promptness of punishment are 
more powerful deterrents than severity.”). 
 157. Moreover, increasing the punishment for battering a parking control officer or sim-
ilarly unpopular occupation does not have a principled stopping point and leads to counter-
intuitive results. Jurisdictions have not chosen to confer special protection on everyone who 
is more likely to be victimized. If the goal is to deter the victimization of likely victims, it 
would be sensible to enhance the punishment for robbing the rich or punching annoying 
people. But the perverse result of such an enhancement is to incentivize offenders to victim-
ize individuals who are the least sensible victims—e.g., stealing from the poor and punching 
pleasant people. 
 158. LA. STAT. ANN. §§ 14:34(B) (aggravated battery), 14:34.1(C) (second degree battery) (2016). 
 159. Both offenses carry identical maximum terms of imprisonment. Aggravated battery 
and second degree battery are punishable by up to ten and five years’ imprisonment with or 
without hard labor, respectively. LA. STAT. ANN. §§ 14:34(B), 14:34.1(C) (2016). 
 160. La. H. Admin. of Criminal Justice Comm. Hearing, Mar. 28, 2012, at 7:05  
(testimony of District Attorney Jerry Jones), http://house.louisiana.gov/H_Video/ 
2012/Mar2012.htm. 
 161. La. S. Judiciary C Comm. Hearing, May 1, 2012, at 1:43:59 (testimony of District 
Attorney Jerry Jones), http://senate.la.gov/Video/2012/May.htm#1. 
 162. Id. at 1:45:53 (testimony of District Attorney Jerry Jones). 
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already carried enhanced penalties as victims of battery—e.g., “if we 
protect the energy worker, we should protect the veteran.”163 
 These statements are not confined only to protections for members 
of the military. For example, during floor debate in the Louisiana 
House of Representatives on a bill that would increase the punishment 
for battery of a school teacher, the bill’s sponsor advocated that the bill 
simply duplicated the enhanced punishment for battery of a police of-
ficer and that teachers “are just as important as law enforcement to 
our community.”164 Statements also appear in numerous California 
legislative histories noting that bills proposing enhanced punishment 
for one group are consistent with various previous enhanced penalties 
afforded to other groups.165 Once some critical mass of groups is pro-
tected by enhanced penalties, the tide of protecting further classes is 
hard to stem. After noting recently presented bills to enhance penal-
ties for battering taxi drivers and security guards, one Louisiana Sen-
ator succinctly stated: “where does this stop on creating special clas-
ses?”166 The answer, unfortunately, is that legislatures practice poor 
self-restraint in this area. If punishment enhancements are created to 
“honor” the protected group, legislatures are wont to identify group 
after group for recognition. 
 Moreover, enhancing punishments through the criminal law is not 
the proper tool for recognizing society’s appreciation of certain groups 
or individuals. Someone should not have to serve additional prison 
time to show veterans that society appreciates their service. Punish-
                                                                                                                                        
 163. La. H. Admin. of Criminal Justice Comm. Hearing, supra note 160, at 22:18 (testimony 
of District Attorney Jerry Jones), http://house.louisiana.gov/H_Video/2012/Mar2012.htm; see 
also id. at 1:45 (testimony of Rep. Jay Morris) (arguing that members of the armed forces are 
“equally deserving” for enhanced protection given the already-existing enhancements for 
batteries of police officers, school teachers, and bus operators); La. S. Judiciary C Comm. 
Hearing, supra note 161, at 1:41:11 (testimony of Rep. Jay Morris) (noting that the enhance-
ment would be in line with other battery enhancements covering bus drivers and law en-
forcement officers). 
 164. La. H. Floor Deb., May 12, 2009, at 1:42:55 (statement of Rep. Ricky Templet), 
http://house.louisiana.gov/H_Video/2009/May2009.htm. Another representative challenged 
the bill’s sponsor with the question, “why are you talking about law enforcement officers?” 
Id. at 1:43:00 (question of Rep. Richard Gallot). The bill’s sponsor responded that teachers 
“deserve the same protection as law enforcement” because they educate the community. Id. 
at 1:43:20 (statement of Rep. Ricky Templet). 
 165. See, e.g., Cal. S. Comm. Analysis of SB 1509 (Apr. 2, 2008) (explaining that the bill 
proposing enhanced punishment for assault of a highway worker “simply provide[s] similar 
protections” as those provided by existing law “for assaults on various public servants, in-
cluding peace officers and operators of public transportation services”); Cal. Assemb. Comm. 
Analysis of AB 1686 (Apr. 17, 2007) (statement in support of bill enhancing penalty for as-
saulting parking control officers noted that it would extend existing penalties for assaults on 
other classes of public safety officers to parking control officers because “[a]ll public safety 
officers deserve to be treated with respect in the course of carrying out their duties”). 
 166. La. S. Floor Deb., May 7, 2012, at 1:42:10 (question of Sen. Dan Claitor),  
http://senate.la.gov/Video/2012/May.htm#1. 
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ment should only be enhanced—or imposed at all—for a purpose re-
lated to the criminal law, not as a hat tip or a sign of respect for a group 
to which the victim happens to belong. If the rationale for enhancing 
the punishment for battering a public bus driver is that the bus driver 
is vulnerable because she is required by her occupation to pick up un-
known persons from the side of the road, it does not follow that the 
punishment for battering a military veteran must also be enhanced to 
show that society values military veterans at least as much as bus 
drivers. It only makes sense to similarly enhance the punishment for 
battering veterans if veterans are similarly vulnerable to victimization 
when compared to bus drivers. Otherwise legislatures quickly trod into 
dangerously inegalitarian territory by enhancing the punishment for 
victimizing ‘preferred’ groups in society and minimizing the punish-
ment for victimizing (and thereby incentivizing the victimization of) 
less popular individuals and groups. That is a bad road to travel. Pun-
ishment should not be enhanced for the victimization of a group with-
out a solid penological rationale. 
IV.   THE INEQUALITY OF VICTIM-BASED STATUTORY SENTENCING 
ENHANCEMENTS 
 Many believe that the United States is facing a widening of the in-
equality gap. Due to fallout from several recent highly publicized 
events, there is genuine concern that certain lives “matter” more than 
others.167 The country faces heightened awareness and concern about 
social, financial, and racial inequality.168 Statutes that categorize vic-
tims by age, disability, occupation, and the like and assign grades of 
punishment accordingly are particularly out of step with the times. 
 On their face, many of the statutory punishment enhancements 
may feel intuitive. When analyzed more closely, however, these en-
hancements lack a rational stopping point.169 And, by selecting an ar-
bitrary stopping point, they engender inequality. Consider the many 
statutes that enhance punishment for assaulting or battering a 
teacher or other school employee. Some draw the line at certain em-
ployees: a Rhode Island statute prohibits willfully or knowingly strik-
ing “a schoolteacher, student teacher, school security officer or school 
administrator” while the person is engaged in the performance of her 
                                                                                                                                        
 167. For example, the Black Lives Matter movement, created in the wake of the 2013 
acquittal of George Zimmerman, has broadened in scope to focus attention on “all of the ways 
in which Black people are intentionally left powerless at the hands of the state.” See BLACK 
LIVES MATTER, http://blacklivesmatter.com/about/ (last visited Dec. 6, 2016). 
 168. See, e.g., Occupy Wall Street, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ 
Occupy_Wall_Street [https://perma.cc/WL67-82NN] (chronicling the many protests and 
demonstrations of the Occupy movement). 
 169. See supra Sections III.B.2, III.D. 
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duties.170 In Mississippi, a punishment enhancement is triggered if the 
victim of an assault is a “superintendent, principal, teacher or other 
instructional personnel, school attendance officer or school bus 
driver.”171 But if such an enhancement is sensible, surely it should also 
protect other school employees, such as cafeteria workers and custodi-
ans.172 And non-employee volunteers at the school.173 And students.174 
And outside vendors, visitors, parents, and other licensees and guests 
of the school. And the protection should extend beyond public primary 
and secondary schools to all levels of education both public and pri-
vate.175 And on and on. 
 Every category could be similarly questioned until it is meaning-
lessly expanded or capped at some arbitrary point.176 These statutes, 
with their arbitrary lines, communicate that folks on one side of the 
line are more important or worthier of protection than folks on the 
other side of the line. The rational offender is incentivized to target 
victims who possess none of the triggering characteristics. Effectively, 
the statutes say: ‘the state prefers that you assault this person instead 
of this other person.’177 This message violates the norm of social equal-
ity. It should be abandoned. 
                                                                                                                                        
 170. 11 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-5-7 (2016) (the offender must also act). 
 171. MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-7(14) (2011) (the victim must be acting within the scope of 
employment at the time of the assault). 
 172. Many states’ enhancements are triggered by an attack on any school employee. See, 
e.g., OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 650.7 (2016) (“school employee,” including “a teacher, principal, or 
any duly appointed person employed by a school system or employees of a firm contracting 
with a school system for any purpose, including any personnel not directly related to the 
teaching process and school board members during school board meetings”); V.I. CODE ANN. 
tit. 14, § 298(8) (2016) (knowing assault of a “teacher or other person employed in  
any school”). 
 173. Very few states include volunteers along with school employees. See HAW. REV. 
STAT. § 707-711(1)(e) (2016) (defining educational worker to include volunteers); KY. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 508.025(1)(a)(10) (West 2016); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-33(c)(6) (2016). 
 174. Very few states include students along with school employees. See GA. CODE  
ANN. § 16-5-21(j) (2016) (aggravated assault involving the use of a firearm within a school 
safety zone upon a student, teacher, or other school personnel); 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/12-
3.05(e) (2016) (aggravated battery based on use of firearm); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 650.7 (2016) 
(assault or battery or both). 
 175. Some states limit the enhancement to public schools or elementary or secondary 
schools. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-6-21(a)(5) (2016) (“employee of a public educational institu-
tion”); IDAHO CODE § 18-916 (2016) (“Every parent, guardian or other person who upbraids, in-
sults or abuses any teacher of the public schools, in the presence and hearing of a pupil thereof, 
is guilty of a misdemeanor.”); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 508.025(1)(a)(9) (West 2016) (limited to ele-
mentary or secondary school employees); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2702(a)(5) (2016) (same). 
 176. Another alternative is for the location of the offense to trigger the enhancement 
rather than a characteristic of the victim. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 241.2 (West 2016) (as-
sault on school or park property); MO. REV. STAT. § 565.075 (2016) (assault on school property). 
 177. One particularly egregious example of line drawing makes it unlawful to cause any 
person lawfully present in a penitentiary to come into contact with certain bodily fluids un-
less that person is an inmate. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-17-11(1)(d) (2016). 
38  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:1 
  
 As explained above, the same goals can be accomplished through 
rewriting the statutes to focus on their underlying legitimate purposes 
rather than imperfect characteristic-based proxies. Triggering an en-
hancement for victimizing “vulnerable individuals” does not perpetu-
ate inequality the way an enhancement triggered by targeting the 
young or the old or the disabled does. “Vulnerable” is not a static de-
scription; an individual may move in and out of the category over the 
course of a lifetime. More pointedly, an individual may be vulnerable 
to victimization for some offenses but not others. An enhancement for 
victimizing vulnerable individuals does not label any group as per se 
more deserving of protection than another. 
 Punishing offenses that have the likelihood of inflicting greater 
harms may be sensible. But to do so, society should not use enhance-
ments triggered by the victimization of lifeguards, firefighters, and law 
enforcement officers. Such enhancements improperly communicate 
that individuals engaged in these occupations are more deserving of 
protection than others who work as fishermen, civil engineers, and lab 
technicians. Instead of categorizing victims by occupation, the en-
hancement should be keyed to the infliction (or risk of infliction) of 
greater harm.178 For example, instead of carving out a special enhance-
ment for assaulting an emergency medical technician, the same pur-
pose is better served by enhancing the offender’s punishment for as-
saulting ‘any person while such person is rendering emergency care.’179 
Or, better yet, by enhancing the offender’s punishment when the of-
fense resulted in the infliction of, or likely infliction of, significantly 
greater harm than the immediate injury to the primary victim. 
 These more nuanced enhancements are more flexible and will re-
quire a modicum of more judicial work. Indeed, they shift the burden 
of judging back onto judges. These punishment decisions should be 
driven by judgment, not by legislatively prescribed categories. Instead 
of simply determining whether the victim was working as process 
server180 or agricultural inspector181 or legislator182 at the time of the 
offense, the sentencing judge should make the more meaningful deter-
mination of whether the victim was especially vulnerable or whether 
the offense conduct created the likelihood of greater harm. If so, the 
state’s legislature may determine that a statutory enhancement is 
                                                                                                                                        
 178. See supra Section III.B. 
 179. Delaware’s second-degree assault statute is a hybrid of both approaches. See DEL. 
CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 612(a)(4)-(5) (2015) (intentionally causing “physical injury to the opera-
tor of an ambulance, a rescue squad member, licensed practical nurse, registered nurse, par-
amedic, [] licensed medical doctor . . . [or] any other person while such person is rendering 
emergency care”). 
 180. CAL. PENAL CODE § 241(c) (West 2016) (assault); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-2(b)(10) (2016). 
 181. MINN. STAT. § 609.2231(6)(1) (2016). 
 182. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2702(a)(6), (c)(32) (2016). 
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proper. Removing the divisive labels, the per se categorization of victims 
based on certain binary traits, will both align better with egalitarian 
principles and further the underlying purposes of these enhancements. 
V.   CONCLUSION 
 The practice of enhancing punishment based on characteristics of 
the victim is deeply entrenched in American criminal statutes. It 
should not be. Such trait-based statutory enhancements send the 
wrong message: that society prefers the victimization of some individ-
uals rather than others. These enhancements create classes of  
“preferred victims” that do not square with our society’s aspirations  
of equality. 
 These trait-based enhancements serve as proxies for other purposes 
of enhanced punishment. Some of these purposes are legitimate uses 
of the criminal law and some are not. For example, seeking to deter 
offenses against vulnerable victims or to increase punishment based 
on the infliction or risk of infliction of greater harm are defensible ra-
tionales for enhancing punishment. Unfortunately, the proxies cur-
rently used in many state statutes, such as age, disability, and occu-
pation, are imperfect substitutes for these rationales. Thus, legisla-
tures should rewrite the statutes so that the enhanced punishment is 
linked directly to the underlying purpose of the punishment rather 
than to a physical or occupational characteristic of a victim. Other pur-
poses that motivate these enhancements, such as a desire to incentiv-
ize certain occupations or to honor certain individuals, are not legiti-
mate uses of criminal punishment. Enhancements based on these mo-
tivations should be repealed. 
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APPENDIX. LIST OF SPECIALLY-PROTECTED VICTIMS BY JURISDICTION 
Alabama: Peace officer, detention or correctional officer at any munic-
ipal or county jail or state penitentiary, emergency medical personnel, 
utility worker, firefighter, teacher, employee of a public educational 
institution, health care worker.183 
Alaska: Child under twelve years of age, child under sixteen years of 
age but at least twelve years of age.184 
Arizona: Person at least sixty-five years of age, disabled person, minor 
under fifteen years of age, peace officer, constable, firefighter, fire in-
vestigator, fire inspector, emergency medical technician, paramedic, 
teacher, person employed by any school, health care practitioner, pros-
ecutor, code enforcement officer, state or municipal park ranger, public 
defender, public safety employee or volunteer, employee of the Arizona 
state hospital or the employing agency, correctional facility employee, 
private prison security officer.185 
Arkansas: Woman who is pregnant with an unborn child, person 
twelve years of age or younger, law enforcement officer, firefighter, 
code enforcement officer, employee of a correctional facility, teacher or 
other school employee, individual sixty years of age or older, officer or 
employee of the state, physician, emergency medical services person-
nel, licensed or certified health care professional, health care provider, 
individual who is incompetent, athletic official.186 
California: Parking control officer, peace officer, firefighter, emergency 
medical technician, mobile intensive care paramedic, lifeguard, pro-
cess server, traffic officer, code enforcement officer, animal control of-
ficer, search or rescue member, physician, nurse, custodial officer, per-
son on public transportation, highway worker, school employee, juror, 
alternate juror, member of the United State Armed Forces, operator 
or driver or passenger of bus or taxicab or streetcar or cable car or 
trackless trolley or other motor vehicle, school bus driver, station 
agent, ticket agent, sports official, elder or dependent adult under sev-
enty years of age, elder or dependent adult seventy years of age  
or older.187 
Colorado: Peace officer, firefighter, pregnant individual, emergency 
medical service provider, emergency medical care provider, mental 
                                                                                                                                        
 183. ALA. CODE § 13A-6-21 (2016). 
 184. ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.220 (2016). 
 185. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-701, 13-1204, 13-1210, 13-1212 (2016). 
 186. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 5-13-201, 5-13-202, 5-13-209, 5-13-211 (2016).  
 187. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 241, 241.1, 241.3, 241.4, 241.5, 241.6, 241.7, 241.8, 243, 243.1, 
243.25, 243.3, 243.35, 243.6, 243.65, 243.8, 245, 245.2, 245.3, 245.5, 243.7, 368 (West 2016). 
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health professional employed by or under contract with the depart-
ment of human services, elderly person, judge of a court of competent 
jurisdiction, officer of a court of competent jurisdiction, person em-
ployed by or under contract with a detention facility, person employed 
by the division in the department of human services responsible for 
youth services, employee of a detention facility.188 
Connecticut: Person under ten years of age, witness, elderly person at 
least sixty years of age, blind person, disable person, pregnant person, 
person with intellectual disability in the first degree, employee of the 
Department of Correction, employee or member of the Board of Par-
dons and Paroles.189 
Delaware: Law enforcement officer, hospital or nursing home em-
ployee, physician, medical professional, ambulance attendant, emer-
gency medical technician, advanced emergency medical technician, 
paramedic, Delaware State Fire Police Officer, correctional officer, vol-
unteer firefighter, full-time firefighter, pregnant female, fire marshal, 
sheriff, deputy sheriff, public transit operator, code enforcement con-
stable, code enforcement officer, operator of an ambulance, rescue 
squad member, licensed practical nurse, registered nurse, licensed 
medical doctor, person who is sixty-two years of age or older, state em-
ployee, state officer, person who has not yet reached the age of six 
years, security officer, sports official (any person who serves as a reg-
istered, paid or volunteer referee, umpire, line judge, or acts in any 
similar capacity during a sporting event), child who is three years of 
age or younger, child who has significant intellectual or developmental 
disabilities, vulnerable adult.190 
District of Columbia: Public vehicle inspection officer, law enforcement 
officer, official or employee of the District of Columbia, family member 
of an official or employee of the District of Columbia, vulnerable adult, 
individual who is sixty years of age or older, citizen patrol member, 
minor, taxicab driver, transit operator, Metrorail station manager.191 
Florida: Pregnant individual, law enforcement officer, firefighter, 
emergency medical care provider, railroad special officer, traffic acci-
dent investigation officer, nonsworn law enforcement agency employee 
who is certified as an agency inspector, blood alcohol analyst, breath 
test operator, law enforcement explorer, traffic infraction enforcement 
officer, parking enforcement specialist, security officer, staff member 
                                                                                                                                        
 188. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 18-3-202, 18-3-203, 18-3-204, 18-1.3-401, 18-1.3-501 (2016).  
 189. CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 53a-59, 53a-59a, 53a-59b, 53a-59c, 53a-60, 53a-60b, 53a-60c, 
53a-61a (2015 & Supp. 2016).  
 190. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 601, 605, 606, 612, 613, 614, 1103A, 1105 (2016). 
 191. D.C. CODE §§ 22-404.02, 22-404.03, 22-405, 22-933, 22-851, 22-3602, 22-3751, 22-
3751.01, 22-3601, 22-3611 (2016). 
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of a sexually violent predators detention or commitment facility, juve-
nile probation officer, staff member of a detention or commitment fa-
cility, person who provides health services, employee of correctional 
facility, person sixty-five years of age or older, school district employee 
or elected official, private school employee, Florida School for the Deaf 
and the Blind employee, university lab school employee, state univer-
sity employee, employee of an entity of the state system of public edu-
cation, sports official, employee or protective investigator of the De-
partment of Children and Family Services, employee of a lead commu-
nity-based provider and its direct service contract providers, employee 
of the Department of Health or its direct service contract providers, 
visitor to a detention facility, detainee in a detention facility, code  
inspector, child.192 
Georgia: Employee of a public school system, female who is pregnant, 
peace officer, person who is sixty-five years of age or older, correctional 
officer, student, teacher, school personnel, child under the age of four-
teen years, officer of a court (judge, attorney, clerk of court, deputy 
clerk of court, court reporter, court interpreter, or probation officer), 
police officer, correction officer, detention officer, sports official (person 
who officiates, umpires, or referees an amateur contest at the colle-
giate, elementary or secondary school, or recreational level), person 
who is admitted to or receiving services from a long-term care or as-
sisted living facility, child under the age of eighteen.193 
Guam: Peace officer, incompetent person.194 
Hawaii: Correctional worker, educational worker, emergency medical 
services provider, person employed at a state-operated or -contracted 
mental health facility, firefighter, water safety officer, law enforce-
ment officer, emergency worker.195 
Idaho: Pregnant individual, justice, judge, magistrate, prosecuting at-
torney, public defender, peace officer, bailiff, marshal, sheriff, police 
officer, peace officer standards and training employee involved in 
peace officer decertification activities, emergency services dispatcher, 
correctional officer, employee of the department of correction, em-
ployee of a private prison contractor while employed at a private cor-
rectional facility in the State of Idaho, employee of the department of 
water resources, jailer, parole officer, misdemeanor probation officer, 
officer of the Idaho state police, fireman, social caseworkers or social 
work specialists of the department of health and welfare, employee of 
a state secure confinement facility for juveniles, employee of a juvenile 
                                                                                                                                        
 192. FLA. STAT. §§ 784.045, 784.07, 784.071, 784.074, 784.075, 784.076, 784.078, 784.08, 
784.081, 784.082, 784.083, 784.085 (West 2016). 
 193. GA. CODE ANN. §§ 16-5-20, 16-5-21, 16-5-23, 16-5-23.1, 16-5-24, 16-5-70 (2016). 
 194. 9 GUAM CODE ANN. §§ 19.30, 31.40 (2015).  
 195. HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 707-711, 707-712.5, 707-712.6, 707-712.7 (2016). 
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detention facility, teacher at a detention facility or a juvenile probation 
officer, licensed emergency medical services personnel, member or em-
ployee or agent of the state tax commission, United States marshal, 
federally commissioned law enforcement officer or deputy or agent, 
peace officer, sheriff, detention officer, correctional officer, staff mem-
ber or private contractor or employee of a county or state correctional 
facility, authorized visitor to a county or state correctional facility or 
work release center or labor camp, public school teacher, student,  
vulnerable adult.196 
Illinois: Physically handicapped person, person sixty years of age or 
older, teacher, school employee, park district employee, peace officer, 
community policing volunteer, fireman, private security officer, emer-
gency management worker, emergency medical technician, utility 
worker, correctional officer, probation officer, correctional institution 
employee, county juvenile detention center employee, Department of 
Human Services employee, Department of Human Services officer, 
employee or subcontractor of the Department of Human Services su-
pervising or controlling sexually dangerous persons or sexually violent 
persons, officer or employee of the State of Illinois, transit employee, 
transit passenger, sports official, coach, person authorized to serve 
process, special process server, employee of a police department, em-
ployee of a sheriff’s department, traffic control municipal employee, 
child, intellectually disabled person, child under the age of thirteen 
years, severely or profoundly intellectually disabled person, pregnant 
person, judge, taxi driver, merchant, student.197 
Indiana: Law enforcement officer, person summoned and directed by a 
law enforcement officer, employee of a penal facility, employee of a ju-
venile detention facility, firefighter, person less than fourteen years of 
age, person who has a mental or physical disability, endangered adult, 
employee of the department of correction, department of child services 
employee, pregnant woman, emergency medical services provider.198 
Iowa: Peace officer, jailer, correctional staff, member or employee of 
the board of parole, health care provider, employee of the department 
of human services, employee of the department of revenue, fire fighter, 
employee of a jail or institution or facility under the control of the de-
partment of corrections, student (hazing).199 
Kansas: Law enforcement officer, school employee, mental health em-
ployee, dependent adult, child under the age of eighteen years.200 
                                                                                                                                        
 196. IDAHO CODE §§ 18-904, 18-907, 18-915, 18-915B, 18-916, 18-917, 18-917A, 18-1505 (2016). 
 197. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-2, 5/12-3.05 (2016). 
 198. IND. CODE § 35-42-2-1 (2016). 
 199. IOWA CODE §§ 708.3A, 708.3B, 708.10 (2017). 
 200. KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 21-5412, 21-5413, 21-5417, 21-5602 (2016). 
44  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:1 
  
Kentucky: Peace officer (state, county, city, or federal), employee of a 
detention facility, employee of a state residential treatment facility, em-
ployee of a state staff secure facility for residential treatment, employee 
of the Department for Community Based Services, paid or volunteer 
emergency medical services personnel, paid or volunteer member of an 
organized fire department, paid or volunteer rescue squad personnel, 
probation and parole officer, transportation officer, employee or volun-
teer of a public or private elementary or secondary school or school dis-
trict, school bus driver, person twelve years of age or less, person who is 
physically helpless, person who is mentally helpless.201 
Louisiana: Active member of the United States Armed Forces, disabled 
veteran, police officer, school teacher, school or recreation athletic con-
test official, correctional facility employee, bus operator, child welfare 
worker, adult protective service worker, infirm person, disabled per-
son, person aged sixty years or older, employee of a store or merchant, 
peace officer, utility service employee.202 
Maine: Person who is less than six years of age, pregnant person.203 
Maryland: Law enforcement officer, parole or probation agent, em-
ployee or inmate of a state correctional facility, employee or inmate of 
a local correctional facility, employee or inmate of a sheriff’s office,  
student (hazing).204 
Massachusetts: Person who is pregnant, public employee, firefighter, 
person with an intellectual disability, emergency medical technician, 
ambulance operator, ambulance attendant, health care provider, child, 
elder person sixty years of age or older, person with a disability.205 
Michigan: Employee of the family independence agency, police officer, 
conservation officer, sheriff, deputy sheriff, constable, peace officer, 
firefighter, emergency medical service personnel, individual engaged 
in a search and rescue operation, employee or contractor of a public 
utility, pregnant individual.206 
Minnesota: Peace officer, correctional employee, minor, person under 
the age of four, member of municipal or volunteer fire department, 
emergency medical services personnel, physician or nurse or person 
providing health care services in a hospital emergency department, 
employee of the Department of Natural Resources, probation officer or 
other qualified person employed in supervising offenders, employee or 
                                                                                                                                        
 201. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 508.025, 508.100, 508.110, 508.120 (West 2016). 
 202. LA. STAT. ANN. §§ 14:34, 14:34.1, 14:34.2, 14:34.3, 14:34.4, 14:34.5, 14:34.5.1, 
14:34.7, 14:35.1, 14:35.2, 14:37, 14:37.2, 14:37.3, 14:37.5, 14:37.6, 14:38.2, 14:38.3 (2016). 
 203. ME. REV. STAT. tit. 17-A, §§ 207, 208-C (2016). 
 204. MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW §§ 3-203, 3-205, 3-210, 3-607 (West 2016). 
 205. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 265 §§ 13A, 13D, 13D1/2, 13F, 13I, 13J, 13K, 15A, 15B (2016). 
 206. MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 750.81c, 750.81d, 750.81e, 750.90a, 750.90b (2016). 
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other individual who provides care or treatment at a secure treatment 
facility, school official, agricultural inspector, occupational safety and 
health investigator, child protection worker, public health nurse, ani-
mal control officer, parole officer, community crime prevention group 
member, vulnerable adult, reserve officer, employee or contractor of a 
utility, transit operator.207 
Mississippi: Statewide elected official, law enforcement officer, fire-
man, emergency medical personnel, public health personnel, social 
worker or family protection specialist or family protection worker em-
ployed by the Department of Human Services or another agency, Divi-
sion of Youth Services personnel, county or municipal jail officer, su-
perintendent or principal or teacher or other instructional personnel, 
school attendance officer, school bus driver, judge of a circuit, chan-
cery, county, justice, municipal or youth court, judge of the Court of 
Appeals, justice of the Supreme Court, district attorney, legal assis-
tant to a district attorney, county prosecutor, municipal prosecutor, 
court reporter employed by a court, court administrator, clerk or dep-
uty clerk of the court, public defender, utility worker, pregnant 
woman, female of previous chaste character.208 
Missouri: Incapacitated person, law enforcement officer, corrections of-
ficer, emergency personnel, highway worker in a construction or work 
zone, utility worker, cable worker, probation officer, parole officer, vis-
itor in a correctional facility, prisoner in a correctional facility, mental 
health employee, visitor or other person at a secure facility, person 
who is seventeen years of age or younger, employee of any law enforce-
ment agency, person sixty years of age or older, vulnerable person, 
child who is less than eighteen years of age, child who is less than 
fourteen years of age.209 
Montana: Peace officer, judicial officer, sports official, minor under 
fourteen years of age, minor under thirty-six months of age, law en-
forcement officer, staff person of a correctional or detention facility, 
health care provider, emergency responder.210 
Nebraska: Vulnerable adult.211 
Nevada: Peace officer, person employed in a full-time salaried occupa-
tion of firefighting, member of a volunteer fire department, jailer or 
guard or matron or other correctional officer of a city or county jail, jus-
tice of the Supreme Court, district judge, justice of the peace, municipal 
                                                                                                                                        
 207. MINN. STAT. §§ 609.221, 609.223, 609.2231, 609.2335 (2016). 
 208. MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 97-3-7, 97-3-37, 97-3-71 (2016). 
 209. MO. REV. STAT. §§ 565.070, 565.081, 565.082, 565.083, 565.085, 565.086, 565.090, 
565.092, 565.180, 565.182, 565.184, 565.210, 565.212, 565.214, 568.060 (2016). 
 210. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 45-5-212, 45-5-214, 45-5-210, 45-5-211 (2015). 
 211. NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-386 (2016). 
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judge, magistrate, court commissioner or master or referee, employee of 
the state whose official duties require the employee to make home visits, 
provider of health care, school employee, sports official, taxicab driver, 
transit operator, person less than eighteen years of age, person less than 
fourteen years of age, older person, vulnerable person.212 
New Hampshire: Person under thirteen years of age, law enforcement 
officer, sitting member of a general court or immediate family member, 
executive councilor or immediate family member, past or present gov-
ernor or immediate family member, member of the judiciary or imme-
diate family member, marital master or immediate family member, 
elderly adult, disabled adult, impaired adult.213 
New Jersey: Law enforcement officer, paid or volunteer fireman, per-
son engaged in emergency first-aid or medical services, school board 
member, school administrator, teacher, school bus driver, employee of 
a school or school board, employee of the Division of Child Protection 
and Permanency, justice of the Supreme Court, judge of the Superior 
Court, judge of the Tax Court, municipal judge, operator of a motorbus 
or the operator’s supervisor, employee of a rail passenger service, De-
partment of Corrections employee, county corrections officer, juvenile 
corrections officer, state juvenile facility employee, juvenile detention 
staff member, juvenile detention officer, probation officer, sheriff, un-
dersheriff, sheriff's officer, employee or contractor of a utility company, 
health care worker, direct care worker at a state or county psychiatric 
hospital or state developmental center, or veterans’ memorial home, 
emergency services personnel involved in fire suppression activities, 
person who is unable to care for himself because of mental disease  
or defect.214 
New Mexico: Pregnant woman, school employee, sports official, health 
care worker.215 
New York: Peace officer, police officer, prosecutor, registered nurse, 
licensed practical nurse, sanitation enforcement agent, New York city 
sanitation worker, firefighter, emergency medical service paramedic, 
emergency medical service technician, medical or related personnel in 
a hospital emergency department, city marshal, school crossing guard, 
traffic enforcement officer, traffic enforcement agent, employee of a lo-
cal social services district directly involved in investigation or response 
to alleged abuse or neglect of a child or vulnerable elderly person or an 
incompetent or physically disabled person, child under the age of 
eighteen, person less than eleven years old, person less than seven 
                                                                                                                                        
 212. NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 200.471, 200.481, 200.508, 200.5099 (2015). 
 213. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 631:1, 631:2, 631:3-a, 631:4-a, 631:8 (2016).  
 214. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:12-1, 2C:12-13, 2C:24-7 (West 2016).  
 215. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 30-3-7, 30-3-9.1, 30-3-9.2, 30-3-9 (2016). 
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years old, employee of a school or public school district, student of a 
school or public school district, train operator, ticket inspector, conduc-
tor, signal person, bus operator, station agent, person who is sixty-five 
years of age or older, judge.216 
North Carolina: Handicapped person (person with a physical or men-
tal disability or an infirmity), patient of a health care facility, resident 
of a residential care facility, sports official, female, child under the age 
of twelve years, officer or employee of the state or any political subdi-
visions of the state, school employee, school volunteer, public transit 
operator, company police officer, campus police officer, law enforce-
ment officer, probation officer, parole officer, employee of a state or 
local detention facility, emergency medical technician, emergency 
health care provider, medical responder, emergency department  
personnel, firefighter.217 
North Dakota: Peace officer, correction institution employee, employee 
of the state hospital, person engaged in a judicial proceeding, member 
of a municipal or volunteer fire department, member of an emergency 
medical services personnel unit, emergency department worker, per-
son under the age of twelve years, law enforcement support animal, 
person lawfully present in a correctional facility or penitentiary who 
is not an inmate, person who is transporting an individual who is  
lawfully detained.218 
Ohio: Peace officer, investigator of the bureau of criminal identification 
and investigation, employee of the department of rehabilitation and 
correction, employee of the department of youth services, employee of 
a local correctional facility, employee of a probation department, per-
son on the grounds of a local correctional facility for business purposes 
or as a visitor, school teacher, school administrator, school bus opera-
tor, firefighter, person performing emergency medical service, officer 
or employee of a public children services agency or a private child plac-
ing agency, health care professional of a hospital, health care worker 
of a hospital, security officer of a hospital, judge, magistrate, prosecu-
tor, court official, court employee.219 
Oklahoma: Aged person, decrepit person, incapacitated person, police 
officer, sheriff, deputy sheriff, highway patrolman, corrections person-
nel, state peace officer, police dog, police horse, service animal that is 
used for the benefit of a handicapped person, referee, umpire, time-
keeper, coach, sports official, person having authority in connection 
with any amateur or professional athletic contest, Department of Cor-
                                                                                                                                        
 216. N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 120.05, 120.08, 120.09, 120.11, 120.12 (McKinney 2016). 
 217. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-32.1, 14-32.2, 14-33, 14-34.2, 14-34.5, 14-34.6, 14-34.7 (2016). 
 218. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 12.1-17-01, 12.1-17-01.1, 12.1-17-02, 12.1-17-09, 12.1-17-11 (2016). 
 219. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2903.11, 2903.12, 2903.13 (West 2015-2016).  
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rections employee, person contracting with the Department of Correc-
tions to provide services, Office of Juvenile Affairs employee, employee 
of any residential facility, emergency medical technician, emergency 
medical care provider, officer of a state district or appellate court, of-
ficer of the Workers’ Compensation Court, school employee, student, 
employee of a facility maintained by a private contractor pursuant to 
a contract with the Office of Juvenile Affairs, employee of the state or 
a county or a city, employee of a contractor of the state or a county or 
a city, vulnerable adult, child, child under twelve.220 
Oregon: Pregnant individual, operator of a public transit vehicle, staff 
member of a youth correction facility, emergency medical services pro-
vider, child ten years of age or younger, operator of a taxi, child under 
six years of age, peace officer, corrections officer, youth correction of-
ficer, parole and probation officer, animal control officer, firefighter or 
staff member.221 
Pennsylvania: Law enforcement officer, officer or employee of a correc-
tional institution or county jail or prison or detention facility or mental 
hospital, child under twelve years of age, teaching staff member, 
school board member or employee, police officer, firefighter, county 
adult probation or parole officer, county juvenile probation or parole 
officer, agent of the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, sher-
iff, deputy sheriff, liquor control enforcement agent, judge of any court 
in the unified judicial system, Attorney General, deputy attorney gen-
eral, district attorney, assistant district attorney, public defender, as-
sistant public defender, federal law enforcement official, state law en-
forcement official, local law enforcement official, person employed to 
assist or who assists any federal or state or local law enforcement offi-
cial, emergency medical services personnel, parking enforcement of-
ficer, magisterial district judge, constable, deputy constable, psychiat-
ric aide, Governor, Lieutenant Governor, Auditor General, State 
Treasurer, Member of the General Assembly, employee of the Depart-
ment of Environmental Protection, individual engaged in the private 
detective business, employee or agent of a county children and youth 
social service agency or of the legal representative of such agency, pub-
lic utility employee, employee of an electric cooperative, wildlife con-
servation officer or deputy wildlife conservation officer of the Pennsyl-
vania Game Commission, waterways conservation officer or deputy 
waterways conservation officer of the Pennsylvania Fish and Boat 
Commission, sports official.222 
                                                                                                                                        
 220. OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, §§ 649, 646, 649.1, 649.2, 649.3, 650, 650.1-9, 650.2, 650.3, 650.4, 
650.5, 650.6, 650.7, 650.8, 650.9, 843.3, 843.5 (2016).  
 221. OR. REV. STAT. §§ 163.160, 163.165, 163.185, 163.208 (2015). 
 222. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 2701, 2702, 2702.1, 2712 (2016). 
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Rhode Island: Uniformed member of the state police or metropolitan 
park police, environmental police officer, state properties patrol of-
ficer, probation officer, parole officer, state government case worker or 
investigator, judge of the supreme or superior or family or district 
court or the traffic tribunal or municipal court, deputy sheriff, city or 
town police officer, city or town firefighter, member of the capitol po-
lice, member of campus security force of a state college or university, 
member of the Rhode Island airport police department, member of the 
Rhode Island fugitive task force, Rhode Island public transit authority 
bus driver, on-duty plainclothes member of a town or city or state po-
lice force, investigator of the department of the attorney general, mem-
ber of the railroad police, uniformed dog officer, out-of-state police of-
ficer called into Rhode Island under a cooperative agreement to pro-
vide mutual aid at the request of the State of Rhode Island, assistant 
attorney general, special assistant attorney general, employee of the 
department of environmental management responsible for adminis-
trative inspections, constable, schoolteacher, student teacher, school 
security officer, school administrator, uniformed member of the correc-
tional officer staff at an adult correctional institution, training school 
employee at the training school for youth, correctional officer, em-
ployee of the department of corrections, person sixty years of age or 
older, person with severe impairments, child ten years of age or 
younger, health care provider, emergency medical services personnel.223 
South Carolina: Law enforcement officer.224 
South Dakota: Law enforcement officer, Department of Corrections 
employee, person under contract assigned to the Department of Cor-
rections, public officer, infant less than three years old, Department of 
Corrections visitor, person authorized by the Department of Correc-
tions to be on the premises, county or municipal jail employee or visitor 
or other person authorized to be on the premises, juvenile detention or 
juvenile facility employee or visitor or other person authorized to be on 
the premises.225 
Tennessee: Law enforcement officer, health care provider, public em-
ployee, employee of a transportation system, firefighter, medical fire 
responder, paramedic, emergency medical technician, first responder, 
child under eighteen years of age, child under eight years of age.226 
Texas: Public servant, security officer, emergency services personnel, 
elderly individual sixty-five years of age or older, disabled individual, 
                                                                                                                                        
 223. 11 R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 11-5-5, 11-5-7, 11-5-8, 11-5-8.1, 11-5-10, 11-5-10.1, 11-5-10.2, 
11-5-11, 11-5-14.2, 11-5-15, 11-5-16 (2016). 
 224. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-9-320 (2016). 
 225. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 22-18-1.4, 22-18-1.05, 22-18-26, 22-18-29, 22-18-29.1 (2016). 
 226. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-13-101, 39-13-102, 39-15-401 (2016). 
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sports participant, witness, prospective witness, informant, person 
who has reported the occurrence of a crime, child fourteen years of age 
or younger.227 
Utah: Pregnant individual, employee of a public or private school, peace 
officer, military servicemember in uniform, correctional officer, health 
care provider, emergency medical service worker, child under eighteen 
years of age, vulnerable adult (an elder adult sixty-five years of age or 
older or an adult who has a mental or physical impairment which sub-
stantially affects the person’s ability to engage in certain activities).228 
Vermont: Law enforcement officer, firefighter, health care worker, 
member of emergency medical personnel, employee of the department 
of corrections, person lawfully present in a correctional facility, child, 
vulnerable adult.229 
Virgin Islands: Peace officer, officer, aged person, decrepit person, fe-
male, child, teacher or person employed in any school, caseworker or 
investigator or person employed by the Department of Health or Hu-
man Services or any agency.230 
Virginia: Law enforcement officer, firefighter, search and rescue per-
sonnel, emergency medical services personnel, pregnant woman, em-
ployee of a state or local or regional correctional facility, person law-
fully admitted to a state or local or regional correctional facility, person 
who is supervising or working with prisoners or persons held in legal 
custody, probation officer, parole officer, local pretrial services officer, 
judge, magistrate, person involved in the care or treatment or super-
vision of inmates in the custody of the Department of Corrections, per-
son involved in the care or treatment or supervision of inmates in the 
custody of or under the supervision of the Department of Juvenile Jus-
tice, employee or other individual who provides control or care or treat-
ment of sexually violent predators committed to the custody of the De-
partment of Behavioral Health and Developmental Services, full-time 
or part-time employee of any public or private elementary or secondary 
school, guidance counselor, health care provider.231 
Washington: Person employed as a transit operator or driver, immedi-
ate supervisor of a transit operator or driver, mechanic of a transit 
company or service provider, security officer of a transit company or 
service provider, school bus driver, immediate supervisor of a school 
bus driver, mechanic employed by a school district transportation ser-
                                                                                                                                        
 227. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 22.01, 22.02, 22.04, 22.11 (West 2016). 
 228. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-5-102, 76-5-102.4, 76-5-102.6, 76-5-102.7, 76-5-109, 76-5-
102.3, 76-5-111 (West 2016).  
 229. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, §§ 1024, 1028, 1028a, 1304, 1376 (2016). 
 230. V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 14, §§ 297, 298 (2016). 
 231. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-51.1, 18.2-55, 18.2-57, 18.2-57.01, 18.2-51.2 (2016). 
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vice, security officer employed by a school district transportation ser-
vice, firefighter, employee of a fire department, employee of a county 
fire marshal’s office, employee of a county fire prevention bureau, em-
ployee of a fire protection district, law enforcement officer, employee 
of a law enforcement agency, peace officer, nurse, physician, health 
care provider, judicial officer, court-related employee, county clerk, 
county clerk’s employee, person located in a courtroom or jury room or 
judge’s chamber or any waiting area or corridor immediately adjacent 
to a courtroom or jury room or judge’s chamber, full or part-time staff 
member or volunteer or educational personnel or personal service pro-
vider or vendor or agent at a juvenile corrections institution or local 
juvenile detention facility, full or part-time staff member or volunteer 
or educational personnel or personal service provider or vendor or 
agent at an adult corrections institution or local adult detention facil-
ity, full or part-time community correction officer, full or part-time em-
ployee of a community corrections office, volunteer who is assisting  
a community correction officer or employee, child under the age  
of thirteen.232 
West Virginia: Child sixteen years of age or under, person who is sixty-
five years of age or older, government representative, health care 
worker, utility worker, emergency service personnel, law enforcement 
officer, school employee, athletic official, driver or conductor or motor-
man or captain or other person in charge of any vehicle or boat.233 
Wisconsin: Person sixty-two years of age or older, person with a phys-
ical disability, officer or employee or visitor or inmate of a state prison 
or a state or county or municipal detention facility, officer or employee 
or agent or visitor or resident of a facility for the care of sexually vio-
lent persons, fire fighter, commission warden, probation or extended 
supervision or parole agent, after-care agent, grand juror, petit juror, 
public officer, technical college district or school district officer or em-
ployee, operator or driver of a public transit vehicle, passenger of a 
public transit vehicle, emergency department worker, emergency med-
ical technician, first responder, ambulance driver, witness, family 
member or person sharing a domicile with a witness, judge, family 
member of a judge, prosecutor, family member of a prosecutor, law en-
forcement officer, family of a law enforcement officer, department of 
revenue official or employee or agent, family member of a department 
of revenue official or employee or agent, department of safety and pro-
fessional services official or employee or agent, family member of a de-
partment of safety and professional services official or employee or 
agent, department of workforce development official or employee or 
                                                                                                                                        
 232. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 9A.36.031, 9A.36.120, 9A.36.130, 9A.36.140, 9A.36.100 (2016).  
 233. W. VA. CODE §§ 61-2-10a, 61-2-10b, 61-2-15a, 61-2-16a, 61-2-15, 61-2-9b (2016). 
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agent, family member of a department of workforce development offi-
cial or employee or agent, employee of a county or city or village or 
town inspecting or enforcing an ordinance or code or other construction 
rule, individual at risk, child.234 
Wyoming: Pregnant woman, child under the age of sixteen years, child 
under the age of eighteen years, vulnerable adult (adult who is unable 
to manage and take care of himself or his money or assets or property 
without assistance as a result of advanced age or physical or mental 
disability), corrections officer, detention officer, department of correc-
tions staff member or volunteer.235 
                                                                                                                                        
 234. WIS. STAT. §§ 940.19, 948.03, 940.20, 940.203, 940.201, 940.205, 940.207, 940.208, 
940.285 (2015-2016).  
 235. WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 6-2-502, 6-2-503, 6-2-507, 6-2-508 (2016). 
